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This dissertation analyzes problems related to barriers to innovation.
In the first chapter, “Delegation and Learning” , I study an agency problem which is
common in many contexts involving financing of innovation. Consider the example of an
entrepreneur, who has an idea but not the money to implement it, and an investor, who has
the money but not the idea. In such a case, how should a financial contract between the
investor and the entrepreneur look like? How much money should the investor provide the
entrepreneur? How should the surplus be divided between them in case the idea turns out to
be profitable? There are certain common elements in situations such as these. First, there is
an element of learning. This is because initially it is unknown if the idea is profitable or not
and hence the idea has to be tried out in the market and both the investor and entrepreneur
learn about the profitability of the idea from observing market outcomes. Second, there is
an element of delegation in the above situation. This is because decision rights regarding
where and when should the idea be tried out is typically in the hands of the entrepreneur and
he knows his idea better than the investor. Finally, the preferences of the investor and the
entrepreneur might not be aligned. For instance, the investor may receive private benefits,
monetary or reputational, from launching products even when these are not profitable. In
such a case, how should a contract that incentivizes the entrepreneur to act in the investor’s
interest look like?
To study these issues, I develop a model in which a principal contracts with an agent
whose ability is uncertain. Ability is learnt from the agent’s performance in projects that the
principal finances over time. Success however also depends on the quality of the project at
hand, and quality is privately observed by the agent who is biased towards implementation. I
characterize the optimal sequence of rewards in a relationship that tolerates an endogenously
determined finite number of failures and incentivizes the agent to implement only good
projects by specifying rewards for success as a function of past failures. The fact that success
becomes less likely over time suggests that rewards for success should increase with past
failures. However, this also means that the agent can earn a rent from belief manipulation
by deviating and implementing a bad project which is sure to fail. I show that this belief-
manipulation rent decreases with past failures and implies that optimal rewards are front-
loaded. The optimal contract resembles the arrangements used in venture capital, where
entrepreneurs must give up equity share in exchange for further funding following failure.
In the second chapter, “Informal Risk Sharing and Index Insurance: Theory
with Experimental Evidence”, written with Francis Annan, we study when does informal
risk sharing act as barrier or support to the take-up of an innovative index-based weather
insurance? We evaluate this substitutability or complementarity interaction by considering
the case of an individual who endogenously chooses to join a group and make decisions about
index insurance. The presence of an individual in a risk sharing arrangement reduces his risk
aversion, termed “Effective Risk Aversion” — a sufficient statistic for index decision making.
Our analysis establishes that such reduction in risk aversion can lead to either reduced or
increased take up of index insurance. These results provide alternative explanations for
two empirical puzzles: unexpectedly low take-up for index insurance and demand being
particularly low for the most risk averse. Experimental evidence based on data from a panel
of field trials in India, lends support for several testable hypotheses that emerge from our
baseline analysis.
In the third chapter, “Investment Timing, Moral Hazard and Overconfidence” ,
I study how overconfidence and financial frictions impact entrepreneurs by shaping their
incentives to learn. I consider a real option model in which an entrepreneur learns about the
quality of project he has, prior to implementation. Success depends on the quality of the
project as well as the unknown ability of the entrepreneur. The possibility of the entrepreneur
diverting investor funds to his private uses, creates a moral hazard problem which leads
to delayed investment and over-experimentation. An entrepreneur who is overconfident
regarding his ability, under-experiments and invests earlier compared to an entrepreneur who
has accurate beliefs regarding his ability. Such overconfidence on behalf of the entrepreneur
creates inefficiencies when projects are self financed, but reduces inefficiencies due to moral
hazard in case of funding by investors.
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1.1 Introduction
Consider a firm that evaluates entering a new business. The firm puts a manager in charge
and finances projects related to this business, such as designing prototypes or testing specific
markets. The manager is better informed about the quality of the projects - that is, their
chances of succeeding - but his interests may not align with those of the firm. For instance,
the manager might be present biased or have a taste for empire building, thus deriving a
larger benefit from implementing projects compared to the firm. Moreover, there is uncer-
tainty about the manager’s fit to lead the firm’s operations in the new business, and therefore
about his ability to make projects succeed. In such situations, how much funding should the
firm place at the manager’s disposal and how can the firm incentivize the manager to work
in its interest?
Learning often involves delegation. A firm while learning about the profitability of en-
tering a new business, often starts small and delegates decision-making to a manager. The
agency problem in the above scenario is related to the fact that the manager usually has
better information about the quality of projects in which he can invest, but has incentives
different from that of the firm. The firm would like the manager to wait for good projects
and only take those up. The manager on the other hand, benefits from working on projects
regardless of quality. However good projects are not always available and hence the firm has
to provide incentives for the manager to wait for the good projects. Further, one of the ad-
vantages of failure in projects is that the agent may earn further rents from future projects,
while a success reveals the business is profitable for the firm and might lead the firm to place
a specialist in charge of the business. Thus, the manager might want to take up projects
which fail in order to postpone the completion of the learning phase. The problem of the
firm is to find the optimal amount of funding and reward structure in order to incentivize
the manager to select the right projects.
To study these issues, we develop a model in which a principal contracts with an agent to
complete a task. The agent’s ability to complete the task is unknown to both the principal
2
and the agent. Completing the task requires success in a project. The agent’s performance in
a project depends both on his ability and the quality of the project at hand. In particular,
only high ability agents have a chance of success in good quality projects, which arrive2
stochastically and may not be available at any given point. Bad quality projects, which
fail regardless of the ability of the agent, are always available. The quality of the projects
available is privately observed by the agent before deciding which project to implement in
any particular period. The principal only gets to observe whether a project implemented
resulted in a success or a failure and not the quality of the project - this is the source of
asymmetric information in the model.
Since only good quality projects can succeed, the principal would want the agent to
only implement these projects. However, the agent is biased towards implementing projects
regardless of quality, since he gets a private benefit regardless of quality of the project and
his ability. In order to incentivize the agent to wait for a good project to arrive, the principal
offers reward for success in a project.
Failure in a project leads to a reduction in belief regarding the agent’s ability and hence
reduces the belief regarding probability of success in a project. This suggests that the re-
wards for success, needed to incentivize the agent to wait, should increase with past failures.
However, this in turn creates an incentive for the agent to deviate and earn a rent. Sup-
pose the principal expects the agent to implement only good projects. If the agent deviates
and implements a bad project, then the resulting failure leads to a reduction in the princi-
pal’s belief regarding the agent’s ability, while the agent’s belief about his ability remains
unchanged3. Thus, the agent can ensure himself a strictly positive rent by this deviation.
The optimal contract has rewards for success decreasing with the number of past failures.
Since success in a project completes the task and obviates the need for further project
implementation, the agent will select a good project only if the rewards for succeeding in the
2The arrival rate of good projects is independent of the agent’s ability. Thus ability here refers to the
agent’s capability of succeeding in good projects.
3This is because the agent knows that performance in bad projects is not indicative of ability.
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project compensates him for the potential loss of continuation rents that selecting a good
project makes more likely. These continuation rents not only include the private benefit from
implementing projects but also rents due to possible divergence in beliefs described above.
These factors combine to produce rewards for success which decrease with the number of
past failures.
Another feature of the optimal contract is that, increasing the number of trials results in
higher rewards to be paid to the agent for success. This is because increasing the number
of trials implies that the potential loss of continuation rents from selecting a good project is
higher for the agent. The loss in continuation rents is higher due to the possibility of getting
private benefits from implementing a larger number of projects as well as earning higher
rents due to the possibility of greater divergence of beliefs.
The optimal number of trials is determined by considering the trade-off between higher
rent paid to the agent and better information obtained through increasing number of trials.
Increasing the number of trials provides more opportunities for a high ability agent to succeed
and thus reduces the probability that the agent was high ability but failed due to a lack of
sufficient opportunities. However as discussed above, increasing the number of trials leads
to higher bonuses paid to the agents for success. We further find that the optimal number of
trials is an increasing function of the prior belief regarding the agent’s ability and the payoff
that the principal gets from success and is a decreasing function of the cost of implementing
projects.
The model can also be used to analyze financial contracting between entrepreneurs and
investors. An entrepreneur often has a better understanding of the products he can launch,
but may receive private benefits, monetary or reputational, from launching products even
when these are not profitable. Furthermore, it is initially unknown whether the entrepreneur
has the necessary skills to make a good product succeed. Also, success by a entrepreneur
often leads to his replacement4 (Wasserman 2008). Thus we can apply the model to highlight
4For instance, the first major task in a new venture is the development of its product or service. However,
once the product is ready, the business often faces different challenges - marketing, sales and customer services
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some of the agency problems present in the relationship between the entrepreneur and the
investor and illustrate how they impact the financial arrangements between them.
Empirical evidence on venture capital financing is consistent with the results obtained
in the model. For instance, Kaplan and Strömberg (2003) find evidence that founders’ cash
flow rights decline over financing rounds and decrease as the firm performance worsens. This
is consistent with the model’s prediction that the rewards for the agent are a decreasing func-
tion of past failures. Similarly the result that a higher prior about the agent’s ability leads
to increased funding is consistent with the findings in the empirical literature on venture
capital financing which suggest that entrepreneurs who have succeeded in the past are likely
to get better deals. (Gompers, Kovner, Lerner and Scharfstein 2010).
Related literature: This paper is related to the literature on contracting for experi-
mentation. The experimentation literature has mostly focused on how to incentivize effort.
Bergemann and Hege (1998, 2005) and Hörner and Samuelson (2013) study dynamic moral
hazard models in which the principal finances the agent to work on projects but the agent
can choose to divert cash for private benefits or equivalently not exert effort. The experi-
mentation literature has focused mainly on how to incentivize effort. However effort is only
part of the overall incentive problem. In a managerial context, it is often likely the case
that managers are industrious but the primary issue is determining how effective managers
are in their tasks5. Our goal in this paper is to understand how the principal can optimally
incentivize the agent to implement the right projects while learning about the agent’s ability.
We analyze a situation where the agent is better informed about the quality of projects but
biased relative to the principal. The experimentation component arises because both the
principal and the agent learn about the agent’s ability as the agent implements projects and
they observe the projects’ outcomes. The relevant deviation is not lowering effort but rather
and hence investors might want to put a different CEO in charge.
5See for instance Kaplan (1984) who considers effort-based models as inadequate for capturing incentive
issues in management. Further PwC (2017) suggests that problem solving, creativity and innovation are
among some of the most important skills as rated by CEOs across countries.
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selecting bad projects.
Halac, Kartik and Liu (2016) study long-term contracts for experimentation, with adverse
selection about the agent’s ability and moral hazard about his effort choice. They find that
the optimal bonus structure is either constant or back-loaded,that is the agent is rewarded
more for later success. In contrast, we find that bonus structure should instead be front-
loaded, that is the agent should be rewarded more for success after a fewer number of failures.
The difference is driven by the fact that in our setting the agent gets a private benefit from
implementing projects and hence must be compensated for the loss in continuation payoffs.
Manso (2011) derives an optimal contract where the agent chooses between shirking,
exploiting a well-known approach , or exploring a new approach. He finds that the optimal
contract which induces the agent to try the new approach exhibits tolerance for early failure
and rewards for long-term success. In contrast, in our setting the agent faces a choice between
implementing a bad project or waiting for a good project to arrive to implement it. Our
model suggests that tolerating early failures and rewarding long-term success might lead to
adverse incentives for an agent who derives benefits from continuing to work on projects. In
particular, our model brings into focus the incentive cost of giving an agent a higher number
of opportunities to succeed.
Hidir (2017) involves the agent exerting effort in order to acquire information about the
unknown quality of a project where both effort choice and signals regarding quality are
private information for the agent. Our model shares the feature that it is ex-ante unknown
how long it may take in order to acquire information. However, in her model, the agent
receives a rent at each point he is waiting for news while in our setup the agent receives a
payoffs only when he implements projects.
This paper is also related to the literature on assessing managerial ability originating from
Holmström (1999). The literature highlights that firms draw inferences about the manager’s
ability based on public signals. This in turn provides an incentive for the manager to take
actions to distort the public signals. However typically the managers take actions which try
6
and make them appear better than they are (or at least no worse than what they are).6.
In contrast, in our model, managers benefit from the possibility of making the principal
more pessimistic about his ability. In that respect, this is closer to the literature on belief
manipulation7 . The literature on belief manipulation has mostly focused on situations in
which agents have to apply (hidden) effort. In contrast, our paper suggests another source -
selecting bad projects - through which the agent might create a divergence between public
belief about his ability and his own private belief and earn a rent on the basis of that.
The paper is connected with the literature on delegation originating from Holmström
(1977, 1984). An important focus in this literature has been on how to incentivize an biased
agent with superior information to act in the principal’s interest. We highlight the fact that
delegation also allows us to learn about the agent’s ability. Recently, there has been quite a
few papers related to dynamic delegation - Hörner and Guo (2015), Lipnowski and Ramos
(2015), Li, Matouschek & Powell (2017) - however these are in a repeated game setting and
there is no learning component. The exception is Guo (2016). In her setting, the agent
receives private information only once at the beginning of the game while in our setup the
agent receives private information multiple times over the course of the game.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we describe the model setup
and solve a benchmark case with complete information. In section 3, we illustrate the basic
insights and tradeoffs by considering the optimal contract which allows for one and two
trials. In section 4, we derive the optimal contract for the general problem. In section 5,
we present comparative statics results. Section 6 discusses some extensions and empirical
implications and we conclude in section 7.
6See for example Hermalin (1993), Holmström and Ricart i Costa (1986).
7See for example Bergemann and Hege (2005), Bhaskar (2012), Wolf (2017).
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1.2 The Model
In this section, I describe the model setup and solve a benchmark case with complete infor-
mation.
1.2.1 Setup
There are two risk-neutral players: a (male) agent and a (female) principal. Both have a
common discount factor   2 (0, 1). Time t = 0, 1, 2... is discrete with an infinite horizon.
Ability: The ability of the agent is persistent and is either high or low. Neither the
principal nor the agent knows the true ability - the initial common prior is that the agent
is high ability with probability ↵0 2 (0, 1)8. The agent’s ability can be assessed through
performance in projects.
Projects: Each period there are up to two types of projects available - “bad” and “good”.
A “bad” project fails regardless of the ability of the agent, whereas “good” project succeeds
with probability   2 (0, 1) if the agent is of high ability and fails otherwise. In each period,
there is always a bad project available, whereas a good project is available with probability
p 2 (0, 1). The availability of projects is independent of the agent’s ability9. The agent can
implement up to one project each period. If a good project becomes available in a specific
period and the agent chooses not to implement it that period, then the agent cannot imple-
8There are a few justifications for the common prior assumption. First, the agent’s assessment of ability
is based on past performance and hence is likely to be known to the principal. Second, the uncertainty
about agent’s ability might be interpreted as uncertainty about the quality of the match ,which is similarly
unknown to both the agent and the principal. Further, we note that although the analysis begins with a
common prior assumption, over the course of time, it is possible that beliefs about ability might diverge due
to asymmetric information.
9Thus one can interpret ability of the agent as corresponding to his ability to capitalize on opportunities
8
ment that particular project in future periods either.
Payoffs: Following Zwiebel (1996), the agent gets a private benefit b > 0 per project
implemented.10 It costs c > 0 to implement a project. Outside options per period for both
the principal and the agent are normalized to 0 each. The principal values successful out-
come at R > c.11
Information: In each period, only the agent observes if a good project is available.
Given the financing from the principal, the agent has a choice between implementing no
project, implementing a bad project or implementing a good project (if available). The
principal can observe if a project is chosen in a specific period and also what the outcome
of the project is. In particular, success in a project is immediately observed by both the
principal and the agent. The quality of the project chosen in case of failure of the project is
not observed by the principal (even ex post).
Learning: Not implementing a project provides no information regarding the ability of
the agent. Suppose the principal expects the agent to implement projects if and only if they
are good. In that case, failure leads to a reduction of the principal’s belief regarding the
ability of the agent. Let ↵k denote the probability that the agent is of high ability given k
past failures and no success. Then (assuming again that the agent only implements good
projects) Bayes’ law implies
↵k =
(1   )k↵0
(1   )k↵0 + (1  ↵0) . (1.1)
Success in a project reveals that the agent is of high ability since only high ability agents
can succeed.
10The private benefit includes benefits such as publicity as well as learning in case of the entrepreneurship
example and also takes into account effort cost of implementing projects - thus one can interpret b as the
net benefit to the agent from implementing projects.
11Since only high ability agent can achieve success, R summarizes the future surplus the principal gets
from interacting with a high ability agent.
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We note that it is possible for the beliefs of the agent and the principal to diverge. In
particular, if an agent selects to implement a bad project, then his belief will be unchanged
following failure. However if the principal expected the agent to implement a project if and
only if it was good and she sees the project fail, then she will reduce her belief regarding the
agent’s ability.
Contracts: We consider contracting at period zero with full commitment on part of the
principal. We restrict attention to contracts in which (i) the agent implements a project if
and only if it is good and (ii) payments are conditional only on the number of past failures.
Formally, a contract is given by (k,X) where k 2 {0, 1, ...} is the maximum number of trials
the principal is willing to fund and X = (X0k, X1k, .., Xsk, ..Xk 1k) specifies the transfer 12
to be made to the agent conditional on the agent succeeding after s failures and the contract
allowing for a total of k failures. We assume limited liability:Xsk cannot be negative. This
is not the most general set of contracts. The simplifying assumptions on the contract set
are designed to bring out in the simplest possible way what the basic economic tension is in
the delegation and learning problem. Once the basic tradeoff is clearly modeled, it is easier
to explore the robustness of the optimal contract to generalizations of the contract set.
One possible interpretation of the contracts under study is as follows. The agent has no
money of his own to fund projects. At the beginning of the game, the principal commits
to a line of credit up to an amount kc to be used for undertaking projects where k is a
non-negative integer and is a choice variable for the principal. This provides enough funds
to try k projects since each project requires c to be implemented. If the agent exhausts the
funding without obtaining a success, the game ends. The other contingency where the game
ends is when the first success is achieved.
Histories: There are two relevant histories to keep track of. One is the public history
12An alternative interpretation for X is given in section 6.
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of past failures, specifically the number of failures up to period t.13 The other is the agent’s
private history including the number of past failures up to t and the quality of projects
implemented up to t.14
Let ⇧k denote the principal’s expected payoff at time 0 from a contract which allows
for k trials and has the agent implement a project if and only if it is good. The principal’s
problem is to choose k and {Xsk}k 1s=0 at time 0 to maximize her expected payoff ⇧k. The
agent’s strategy at a given point in time is to choose which project (if any) to implement
that period as a function of his private history and the projects available at that period. Let
Vk(m, s) be the agent’s expected payoff after s failures, m of which were good projects, in a
k-trial contract15.
Figure 1 illustrates the game tree for the stage game when both good and bad projects
are available and there have been s failures in projects out of which m  s were failures in
good projects. If s   k, then the principal does not finance projects and hence the payoff
to both the principal and the agent is given by 0 each. If s < k, then the principal finances
the project. If the agent chooses not to implement a project, then both the principal and
the agent get 0 each and the number of failures in projects remains unchanged. If the agent
implements a bad project, then the agent gets b and the principal gets  c. The number of
failures which have failed is given by s+ 1, while the number of failures in good projects is
still given by m. If the agent implements a good project, then it can result in either success
or failure. In case the project fails, the agent gets b while the principal gets  c. The number
of projects that have failed equals s+ 1 while the number of good projects that have failed
13Note that since the contract specifies payments only as function of number of past failures, it’s not
required to track the order of sequence of failures and non-implementation. This is without loss of generality
given the IID assumption regarding the availability of good projects.
14The agent’s private history also includes availability of projects in past periods, however this does not
affect payoff.
15If the principal expects the agent to implement a project iff it is good, then s failures corresponds to
the principal’s belief about the agent’s ability to be ↵s while m failures in good projects corresponds to the
agent’s belief about his ability to be ↵m. There is thus a one to one map between the number of failures
(m, s) and the beliefs (↵m, ↵s).
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Figure 1.1: Tree for Stage Game
is given by m + 1. Since the principal does not observe the quality of the project but only
observes failure, she cannot identify if the project implemented was good or bad. If the
good project succeeds, the principal pays the agent Xsk. Thus the agent’s payoff is given by
b+Xsk while the principal’s payoff is given by R Xsk   c.
1.2.2 Complete Information Benchmark
In this subsection, we derive the optimal contract when the principal can observe the quality
of the projects available each period and write a contract which can include the quality. In
this case, the principal implements a project if and only if it is good and keeps experimenting
until the point at which her belief falls below a cutoff level. We derive below this cutoff belief.
Let ↵k denote the belief regarding the agent upon observing k failures and zero successes.
Suppose that there is a good project available. Then if the principal permits the good project
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to be implemented and stops experimenting if the project fails, her payoff is given by
↵k R  c.
In the above expression, ↵k  refers to the probability of success in a good project given k
failures and zero successes in good projects and R is the payoff to the principal in the event
of success. Thus expected surplus from implementing a good project is given by ↵k R and
c is the cost of implementing a project.
The principal should thus experiment as long as the above payoff is non-negative, that
is till the highest k such that
↵k R   c.
Assumption 1: Experimentation is initially profitable in the absence of an agency
problem:
↵0 R   c.
This assumption means that without the agency problem, the principal would be willing
to experiment at least once at the initial belief.
1.3 The Special Case with at Most One or Two Trials
This section illustrates some basic insights and tradeoffs in the special case where first there
is only one trial and second where there may be up to two trials.
1.3.1 One Trial Contract
In this case, the agent gets only one shot at implementing a project. For the contract that
allows for one trial, we need to determine the optimal bonus X01 that incentivizes the agent
13
to implement the project if and only if the project is good. The incentive compatibility
condition for not implementing a project over choosing a bad project is given by
 V1(0, 0)   b. (1.2)
The equation says that the payoff to the agent from not implementing a project has to be
greater than that of selecting the bad project. The payoff from not implementing a project
is given by  V1(0, 0). It refers to the observation that if the agent chooses to not implement
a project, then he gets 0 this period and the next period utility for the agent is still given by
V1(0, 0) since the the number of failures are unchanged if the agent selects not to implement
a project. If the agent selects the bad project, then he gets b this period but the project is
sure to fail and since the contract only allows for one trial, his continuation payoff is 0.
The incentive compatibility condition for choosing the good project if it is available is
given by
b+ ↵0 X01   max( V1(0, 0), b). (1.3)
Given equation (2), we can simplify as
b+ ↵0 X01    V1(0, 0). (1.4)
The left side stands for the expected payoff to the agent if he selects a good project.
It consists of the current gain b that the agent makes if he implements a project and the
expected bonus in case of success. Since the project is good and the belief that the agent is of
high ability is given by ↵0, the probability of success is given by ↵0 . In case of success, the
agent is rewarded by the bonus X01 as stated in the contract. The contract allows for only
one trial; hence if the agent fails, the principal chooses to stop experimenting in which case
the agent receives 0. The term on the right side refers to the payoff from not implementing
a project which is same as before.
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The agent’s ex-ante value in such an incentive compatible contract is given by
V1(0, 0) = p(b+ ↵0 X01) + (1  p) V1(0, 0)
=
p
1   (1  p)(b+ ↵0 X01).
= ✓(b+ ↵0 X01) (1.5)
where ✓ ⌘ p1  (1 p) . Since both p and   lie between 0 and 1, we get 0 < ✓ < 1.
We observe that incentive compatibility for the good project is always satisfied since
  < 1 and the expected payoff from implementing a project is non-negative16. Hence we
only need to make sure that X01 is high enough so that incentive compatibility condition for
the bad project is satisfied. Plugging in the value of V1(0, 0) and solving for X01 we obtain,
X01   b(1   )
 ↵0 p
. (1.6)
The principal’s expected payoff from this contract is given by ⇧1 which satisfies
⇧1 = ✓[↵0 (R X01)  c].
The term R X01 represents the payoff to the principal in case of success while c stands
for the cost of implementing the project. Since the contract allows for only one failure, one
failure ends the experimentation. As the bonus payments enter negatively in the principal’s
profit, she won’t pay the agent more than required and hence inequality (4) is satisfied with





We thus observe that X01 is an increasing function of b and a decreasing function of  ,↵0,  , p
. The purpose of having X01 > 0 is to ensure that if the agent comes across a bad project,
the expected reward from foregoing on the bad project and waiting for a good project to
16From equation (5), we obtain V1(0, 0) = ✓(b + ↵0 X01). Inserting this in equation (4), the right hand
side equals  ✓(b+ ↵0 X01) . Since 0 <  , ✓ < 1, equation (4) is satisfied.
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come along is high enough that he is willing to not implement the bad project. The cost of
passing up on the bad project at hand is the private benefit b. Hence higher is the b, greater
the incentive needs to be for the agent to pass up on that in the current period. Since the
agent has to wait till at least the next period to see if a good project comes along, the more
impatient an agent is, higher needs to be the bonus from succeeding in a good project. The
bonus is only paid out in the event of success in the good project and hence it is decreasing
in ↵0 , the probability of success of the good project. Finally, the lower the value of p, the
more the agent needs to wait for a good project to come along and hence the reward for
waiting has to be higher.





The principal should prefer to offer this contract over not experimenting at all if and
only if ⇧1   0 which gives us:








This inequality says that the principal will want to experiment at least once even in the
second best.
1.3.2 Two Trial Contract
In this case, the agent gets at most two shots at implementing projects. We first consider
what happens in case the first trial results in failure. If the first trial fails, there is only
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one more failure permitted in the contract. Hence the analysis is similar to the analysis for
one failure contract considered above. Since the contract requires the agent to implement
a project if and only if it is good and on path the belief of the agent is ↵1 after the first
failure, we obtain
X12   b(1   )
 ↵1 p
. (1.9)
We observe that the bonus offered to incentivize the agent in the last opportunity has
to be higher in the contract with two trials than in the contract with one trial that is
X12 > X01. This is because the agent’s belief about his ability is lower and hence he needs
a higher incentive to wait for the good project.
In order to determine X02, we consider the incentive compatibility conditions prior to
first failure. The incentive compatibility condition for selecting the good project given 0
failures is now given by
b+ ↵0 X02 + (1  ↵0 ) V2(1, 1)    V2(0, 0). (1.10)
Since the principal does not stop experimenting immediately after a failure but allows
the agent to continue to experimenting, the agent’s payoff upon failure is given by  V2(1, 1)
and not 0 as before.
The incentive compatibility condition for rejecting the bad project gives us
 V2(0, 0)   b+  V2(0, 1). (1.11)
Unlike the one failure contract, failure in a project in this case does not stop experimen-
tation. The agent does not update his beliefs about himself after the expected failure but
the principal’s belief declines to ↵1 (as implementing the bad project is "off path"; that is,
the principal was expecting the agent to implement only good projects). We note that even
if the agent deviates from the principal’s prescribed strategy after 0 failures to implement a
bad project, he will choose to implement a project iff good in the second trial. This follows
from verifying that the two incentive compatibility conditions - (i) b + ↵0 X12    V2(0, 1)
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and (ii)  V2(0, 1)   b are satisfied17. The agent’s value from the contract in such a case is
given by
V2(0, 1) = ✓[b+ ↵0 X12]
The agent’s ex-ante value (on path) is given by
V2(0, 0) = ✓[b+ ↵0 X02 + (1  ↵0 ) V2(1, 1)].
Once again the incentive compatibility for the good project is satisfied since   < 1 and
the expected payoff from implementing the project is non-negative. Thus we only need to
make sure that X02 is high enough so that incentive compatibility condition for the bad






  (1  ↵0 ) ✓2]| {z }+X12[1   ✓(1   )]| {z }>0
>0
(1.12)
We thus observe that X02 is an increasing function of X12.
The principal’s expected payoff from offering a contract which allows for two trials is
given by ⇧2 which satisfies
⇧2 = ✓[↵0 (R X02)  c]
+ ✓2(1  ↵0 )[↵1 (R X12)  c].
Since both X02 and X12 enter negatively in the expression for expected payoff and X02
is increasing in X12, the principal will try to minimize these two as much as possible. Hence












17This is discussed in more detail in Section 4.
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It’s useful to think about the individual terms in the above expression. The first term
plays a similar role as the term in equation (4) - it provides incentives to forego on the bad
project in favor of waiting for a good project to come along. However in equation (14), there
are now two additional terms - these refer to the fact that in the contract with two failures
there are additional benefits to selecting a bad project when there is another opportunity
still remaining. If the agent selects a bad project, he knows for sure that the game will not
end this period - since the project is sure to fail - and hence gives the agent an opportunity
to earn further rent. There are two sources of this additional rent. First, the agent gets to
implement another project which gives him a benefit of b > 0. Second, the agent has the
opportunity to gain an additional rent because his belief is higher than the belief which the
principal had in mind while designing the bonus for the next project - we can see this from








] = V2(1, 1).
We also see thatX02 > X12 - that is the contract has to be front-loaded. While comparing
X02 and X12 we see that the agent is more pessimistic about his ability upon implementing
a good project and failing - hence he has to be possibly provided a greater incentive in order
to make sure he waits for the good project. On the other hand, the agent has to be provided
additional incentives in the first attempt to compensate him to forego the possible rents
from taking up the second project as outlined in the previous paragraph. What X02 > X12
says is that the second effect dominates and hence the contract is front-loaded. We note
that this contrasts with some of the existing results in the literature. For example, Halac,
Kartik and Liu (2016) found instances where contracts have bonuses which are increasing
as the agent gets more pessimistic. The main difference in our model is that the agent gets
a benefit each time a project is undertaken and hence the contract has to compensate the
agent for the loss in continuation value in order to incentivize him to implement only good
projects.
It’s also useful to compare X02 with the bonus XV02 that the principal would have to pay
to the agent in the scenario the principal could verify the quality of the project implemented
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before giving permission to go ahead with the second trial and could commit to firing the
agent in case it was discovered that he had selected a bad project. In this case the the




Thus if the principal could verify the project quality ex-post and commit to firing the
agent for selecting selecting the bad project, the contract becomes back-loaded that is XV02 <
X12.
We also note that X02 > X01, that is increasing the number of trials implies that earlier
success have to be rewarded more in the contract which has higher number of trials. This
is because the agent has to be compensated for greater losses in rents in the contract with
higher number of trials.
If we compare ⇧2 with ⇧1, we see that the principal faces benefits and costs in moving
from a contract with 1 trial to 2 trials. The change in the expected payoff can be decomposed
as:
⇧2   ⇧1 =  ✓2(1  ↵0 )[↵1 (R X12)  c]| {z }
benefit
  ✓↵0 (X02  X01)| {z }
cost
The additional benefit is captured by the term
 ✓2(1  ↵0 )[↵1 (R X12)  c].
This reflects the case that the high ability agent might fail while attempting a good
project on the first attempt which happens with probability (1   ↵0 ) but allows for the
possibility that the agent succeeds on the second attempt.
The cost on the other hand can be seen in the term
✓↵0 (X02  X01).
18This is also the bonus that the principal would pay to an agent if he can costlessly replace the agent
with another agent upon failure in a project. In this case though ability is not agent-specific but is more
about the quality of the idea that is being assessed through projects.
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If we compare it to the case with one failure we see that that the principal gets a lower
payoff if the agent succeeds in the first attempt since X02 > X01. Thus the main tradeoff
to the principal is increasing the number of experiments funded leads to more accurate
information about the ability of the agent but has to be paid for not only in terms of more
cost of experimentation but also in higher rents to the agent in case of earlier success.
1.4 Optimal Contract
In this section, we examine the properties of the optimal contract that incentivizes the agent
to implement the project if and only if it is a good project.
We can decompose the problem into a two step procedure: First, given a maximum num-
ber k of trials that the principal is willing to fund, what should the optimal bonus scheme be
in order for the agent to choose the project if and only if it is a good project? Having found
the optimal bonus scheme, we determine the number of trials the principal is willing to fund.
1.4.1 Optimal Bonus
Definition: Given a maximum number of trials k that the principal is willing to fund,
we say that the bonus scheme (Xsk)s=0,1...k 1 is incentive compatible if under such a bonus
scheme the agent chooses to implement projects if and only if they are good projects. We
define an optimal contract as a contract that is incentive compatible and maximizes the
principal’s expected payoff.
Let (Xsk)s=0,1...k 1 be a incentive compatible bonus scheme . Let ⇧s,k denote principal’s
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expected payoff from such a contract when s < k failures and zero successes in good projects
have taken place. Then ⇧s,k satisfies the following the recurrence relation :
⇧s,k = p[↵s (R Xs,k) + (1  ↵s ) ⇧s+1,k   c] + (1  p) ⇧s,k
With probability p, a good project becomes available and is implemented. This leads to
an expected profit of ↵s (R Xsk) + (1  ↵s ) ⇧s+1,k   c . Given that the bonus scheme is
incentive compatible, all the earlier failures were in good projects and hence the probability
that the agent is high ability is given by ↵s from equation (1). Thus the probability of success
in the good project is given by ↵s . In case of a success, the principal gets R   Xsk since
the contracts specifies Xsk as the bonus to be paid in such a situation. In case of a failure
which happens with probability (1   ↵s ), the future payoff is given by  ⇧s+1,k. Finally c
stands for the cost of implementing the project. With probability 1  p, the good project is
not available and thus a project is not implemented. Hence we move on to the next period
and the profit for the principal is summarized by  ⇧s,k.
The above recurrence relation can be further simplified to yield
⇧s,k = ✓(↵s (R Xsk) + (1  ↵s ) ⇧s+1,k   c)
where ✓ ⌘ p1  (1 p) . Thus the overall expected profit from offering a contract which
tolerates k failures is given by ⇧0,k ⌘ ⇧k where
⇧k = ✓[↵0 (R X0k) + (1  ↵0 ) ⇧1,k   c]
= ✓[↵0 (R X0k)  c] + ✓(1  ↵0 ) ⇧1,k
= ✓[↵0 (R X0k)  c] +
✓2 (1  ↵0 )(↵1 (R X1k) + (1  ↵1 ) ⇧2,k   c)







Given k, the principal’s profit maximization problem is to choose (Xsk)k 1s=0and (Vk(m, s))sm=0
to maximize ⇧k subject to the following constraints: subject to, for each s = 0, ..., k   1,
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b+ ↵m Xsk + (1  ↵m ) Vk(m+ 1, s+ 1)    Vk(m, s) (IC-G)
b+  Vk(m, s+ 1)   Vk(m, s) (IC-B)
Xsk   0 (LL)
where Vk(m, s) is defined by:
Vk(m, s) = max
1Gms,1BGms,1Bms,1Gms+1BGms1
{p[1Gms(b+ ↵m Xsk
+(1  ↵m ) Vk(m+ 1, s+ 1))
+1BGms(1  1Gms)(b+  Vk(m, s+ 1))
+(1  1BGms)(1  1Gms) Vk(m, s)]
+(1  p)[1Bms(b+  Vk(m, s+ 1))
+(1  1Bms) Vk(m, s)]}
where 1Gms is an indicator function which takes value = 1 if the agent selects the good
project (after s public failures of projects, of which m were good) if it is available and 0
otherwise. Similarly 1BGms stands for the indicator function for the agent’s choice regarding
an implementation of bad project if a good project is available ((after s public failures of
projects, of which m were good) while 1Bms stands for the indicator function for the agent’s
choice regarding implementation of a bad project (after s public failures of projects, of which
m were good) if a good project is not available.
Our first result deals with the question of how should the principal set Xsk to maximize
the expected profit from such a contract.
Proposition 1: Suppose the principal’s optimal contract funds up to k trials. Then
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bonuses (Xsk)s=0,1...k 1 in this contract are given by






Proof: See the appendix
Sketch of the proof
The proof is divided into the following steps. Instead of the profit maximization problem,
we focus on the equivalent cost minimization problem.
Step One: We first consider a relaxed problem by restricting agent’s off path strategies
to have only one-period deviations - that is the agent can only deviate once (by either
choosing not to implement a project when a good project is available or by implementing a
bad project) but from then on will choose to implement projects if and only if they are good
projects. Since the bonus schemes are such that they act as incentives against all deviations,
it has to be true that they prevent the agent from these types of deviations. We can thus












subject to for each s = 0, ..., k   1,
b+ ↵s Xs + (1  ↵s ) V Tk (s+ 1, s+ 1)    V Tk (s, s) (IC-G-O-s)
b+  V Tk (s, s+ 1)   V Tk (s, s) (IC-B-O-s)
Xsk   0 (LL)
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where















Step Two: We then show that IC-G-O-s are satisfied. To see this, we observe that
V Tk (s, s) can be rewritten as
V Tk (s, s) = ✓(b+ ↵s Xs + (1  ↵s ) V Tk (s+ 1, s+ 1))
Thus we can rewrite the IC-G-O-s as
b+ ↵s Xs + (1  ↵s ) V Tk (s+ 1, s+ 1)    ✓(b+ ↵s Xs + (1  ↵s ) V Tk (s+ 1, s+ 1))
which is always satisfied since b+↵s Xs+(1 ↵s ) V Tk (s+1, s+1) > 0 and 0 <  , ✓ < 1.
Step Three: Next, if the only off path strategies available to the agent are these one-
period deviations, then all the IC-B-O-s need to hold with equality, otherwise the principal
can decrease bonuses without affecting incentives following s failures and before to increase
profit19.
Step Four: Based on the IC-B-O-s holding with equality, we obtain a difference equation









19It is possible to decrease bonuses with violating limited liability conditions since one can show that
Xsk > 0, which follows from IC-B-O-s and induction - the details are shown in the appendix.
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This gives us a solution for Xsk as stated in the proposition.
Step Five: We finally show that the Xsk we found by restricting the agent’s off-path
strategy are enough to deter the agent from more complex off-path strategies involving mul-
tiple deviations. Intuitively, the contract in the relaxed problem ensured that the agent has
no incentives to deviate if never deviated. The agent’s private belief is either the same as the
public belief (if he deviates by not implementing a project when a good project is available)
or higher (if he deviates by selecting a bad project). Hence we can verify deviating is even
less attractive to the agent if he has deviated before.
Proposition 1 lends itself to the following two corollaries:
Corollary 1: Bonuses are front-loaded i.e X0k > X1k > ... > Xk 1k.
The intuition is that earlier bonuses need to compensate the agent for giving up the
rents that he could have got from future projects as well as rents due to the possibility of
divergence between the private belief of the agent and the belief based on public history.
Corollary 2: Increasing the number of failures allowed increases the bonus needed to
incentivize the agent at each stage: Xsk > Xsk0 for k > k0for s = 0, 1...k0   1.
The intuition follows from observing that an increase in the number of trials implies that
the agent has an opportunity to get greater private benefits by implementing more projects
as well as earn higher rents by causing a greater divergence between public and private
beliefs. Thus the agent has to be compensated for a greater potential loss of continuation
rents for selecting good projects when there is an increase in number of maximum failures
allowed.
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1.4.2 Optimal Number of Trials
Having found the optimal bonus scheme, we move on to examine the question of how should
the principal decide on the optimal number of trials. To understand the determinants, it’s
useful to decompose the impact on expected payoff of the principal as a result of a change
in the number of trials. The change in payoff for the principal if he decides to increase the








✓s s 1↵0(1   )s 1 (Xs 1 k  Xs 1 k+1)
⌘ MBSBk  MCSBk
We can decompose the total change in the expected payoff of the principal into two parts:
the “marginal benefit” and the “marginal cost”. We define and expand on the terms below.
Increasing the number of trials from k to k + 1 has two consequences for the principal’s
expected payoff - first, there is an additional opportunity to succeed in case the first k trials
result in failure and second, the bonuses for success in the first k trials have to be altered as
a consequence of corollary 2.
Since the number of trials has gone up from k to k + 1, there is now an additional
opportunity to experiment. The “marginal benefit” refers to the impact on the expected
payoff due to the principal having one additional chance of experimentation, holding fixed
the bonus to be paid in case of success in the first k trials. We note that the additional trial
is of use only if the first k trials have resulted in failure. For k   1, the expected payoff from






We can decompose this expression into two parts -
Qk 1
m=0(1 ↵m ) refers to the probabil-
ity of no success in the first k trials while ✓k+1 k[↵k (R Xkk+1)  c] refers to the expected
payoff for success in the k + 1th trial. MBSB0 is given by ✓[↵0 (R X01)  c].
Lemma 1: The “marginal benefit” of experimentation is decreasing in the maximum
number of failures tolerated by the principal, that is MBSBk is a decreasing function of k.
Proof: See the appendix
The intuition is that not only does the new opportunity present itself much later (which
is reflected in the terms ✓k+1 k), but it is also less likely to present itself - the probability
is given by
Qk 1
m=0(1   ↵m ) = {1   ↵0 + ↵0(1    )k} - and also when it presents itself the
expected payoff (↵k (R Xkk+1) c) is decreasing in k as well since the probability of success
↵k  is lower and the principal also needs to pay a higher bonusXkk+1 to incentivize the agent.
The “marginal cost” captures the fact that increasing the number of trials permitted
results in increasing the bonus that has to be promised to the agent in case of success after
0, 1, ...k   1 failures. This observation follows from corollary 2. The “marginal cost”20 for





In the above expression, ↵0(1  )s 1  refers to the probability of success in the sth trial,
while ✓s s 1(Xs 1k+1 Xs 1k) refers to (discounted) value of increased bonus. We also define
MCSB0 ⌘ 0.
Using the result for the optimal bonuses from proposition 1, we can rewrite the “marginal
20One could decompose the effect on expected profit due to an increase in the number of trials in different
ways. However it is instructive for the analysis to have the cost of financing a project c be subtracted from
the “marginal benefit”, as opposed to including it as part of “marginal cost”.
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✓s s 1↵0(1   )s 1 (b+ b(1   )
 ↵k p
)
Lemma 2: The “marginal cost” of experimentation is increasing in the maximum num-
ber of failures tolerated by the principal, that is MCSBk is increasing function of k.
Proof: See the appendix
The intuition is that a higher value of k implies a lower value of ↵k which results
in a higher increase in bonus to be paid in the event of earlier success as Xs 1k+1  
Xs 1k = b +
b(1  )
 ↵k p
as well as there being a higher probability of earlier success sincePk
s=1 ✓
s s 1↵0(1   )s 1  is increasing in k as well.
Once we have the decomposition of changes in expected payoff of the principal as a result
of changing the number of trials allowed, we can characterize the optimal number of trials
that the principal should be willing to tolerate. The change in expected payoff due to a
change in the maximum number of trials can be viewed as the difference of the “marginal
benefit” and the “marginal cost”. The “marginal benefit” is a decreasing function of the
number of trials permitted and the “marginal cost” is an increasing function of the number
of trials permitted. Hence the change in expected payoff is positive as long as the “marginal
benefit” exceeds the “marginal cost” and thus the principal should choose the largest number
of trial for which the “marginal benefit” exceeds the “marginal cost”. This is also illustrated
in Figure 2 below.
Proposition 2: The optimal number of trials is unique and given by the highest k for
which MBSBk  MCSBk
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We can also compare the optimal number of trials in the complete information benchmark
and the second best. In the complete information case, there is no bonus to be paid and
hence the “marginal cost” as defined above equals 0 for any number of trials decided upon by
the principal21. We thus have MCCIk = 0 for any k. The “marginal benefit” of an additional





The “marginal benefit” is higher in the complete information benchmark as compared to
the second best. Hence the principal should experiment more in the complete information as
compared to the situation in which the agent has to be incentivized through bonuses. This
discussion is summarized in the following proposition.
Proposition 3: The second best allows for an inefficiently low number of trials compared
to the complete information benchmark.
1.5 Comparative Statics
In this section, we provide comparative statics results on the number of trials and the prin-
cipal’s expected payoff as a function of parameters.
Proposition 4: The principal’s second best expected payoff as well as the number of
trials are increasing in R and ↵0 and decreasing in c.
21Recall that the cost of financing a project c is subtracted from the marginal benefit in the decomposition
described above.
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Figure 1.2: Optimal number of trials
Comparative statics with respect to ↵0
To understand how a change in ↵0 impacts the number of trials, we look at how it impacts
the MBSBk and MCSBk . We note that MBSBk is an increasing function of ↵0(all proofs are in
the appendix) while it is possible forMCSBk to be either an increasing or decreasing function
↵0. The impact on the “marginal cost” is driven through two channels - holding fixed the
number of trials - an increase in ↵0 leads to a reduction in bonus paid when success happens
after a specific number of failures. However it is also more likely that the agent succeeds
earlier, which combined with the front-loading of bonuses imply that the principal could end
up paying more. Hence the impact on MCSBk is ambiguous. Thus it might seem possible
that as a result of increase in ↵0, the increase in “marginal cost” is so high that the principal
might end up reducing the number of experiments he wants to perform. However as shown
in the Appendix, an increase in the prior is always going to lead to an increase in the number
of trials.
The effect on expected payoff is unambiguous as well - holding fixed the number of trials,
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it can be shown that expected payoff of the principal increases as ↵0 increases. Since the
principal is free to vary the number of trials (which includes the option of not changing the
number of trials), her expected payoff is going to be higher in situations when there is an
increase in ↵0.
Comparative statics with respect to c:
An increase in c leads to a reduction in the “marginal benefit” but has no effect on “marginal
cost”. Hence the number of trials permitted is going to be weakly lower. Holding fixed the
number of trials, expected payoff is decreasing in c and hence an increase in c leads to a
reduction in expected payoff.
Comparative statics with respect to R:
An increase in R leads to a increase in the “marginal benefit” but has no effect on “marginal
cost”. Hence the number of trials permitted is going to be weakly higher. Expected payoff
is going to increase following an argument similar to that for the ↵0 case.
1.6 Discussion
1.6.1 Connecting Predictions with Empirics
The model developed can be applied to venture capital industry. We can view Xsk as a
measure of cash-flow rights22 for the entrepreneur upon success. Corollary 1 suggests that
22Cash-flow rights for entrepreneurs are defined as the fraction of a portfolio company’s equity value that
entrepreneurs have a claim to.
32
the cash-flow rights for the entrepreneurs are a decreasing function of the number of past
failures. Kaplan and Strömberg (2003) find evidence that founders’ cash flow rights decline
over financing rounds and increase with firm performance. They suggest that the increase
in VC cash flow rights over financing rounds is consistent with the VC demanding more
equity as compensation for providing additional funding. Our model provides an alternative
explanation based on incentive theory for reasons why founders’ cash-flow rights decline over
financing rounds as well as when firm’s performance becomes worse.
Our model also has some implications for the structure of anti-dilution provisions which
protect previous investors during “down rounds”. 23 Anti-dilution provisions are quite com-
mon ( see for e.g., Kaplan and Strömberg 2003; Gompers, Gornall, Kaplan, and Strebulaev
2016) and are meant to protect the investors against future financing rounds at a lower
valuation than the valuation of the current (protected) round. Typically these come at the
cost of reduced equity shares for the founders during down rounds and are often associated
with loss of motivation on part of the founders. One can interpret the optimal bonuses
identified in proposition 1 as a measure of the maximum amount of equity dilution for the
entrepreneurs per each round that is consistent with still keeping entrepreneurs incentivized
to act in the investor’s interest.
The result that an increase in the prior about the entrepreneur’s ability is associated
with greater financing is consistent with the findings in the empirical literature on venture
capital financing which suggests that entrepreneurs who have succeeded in the past are likely
to get better deals (Gompers, Kovner, Lerner and Scharfstein 2010). The empirical evidence
regarding the effect of c on financing of experimentation is mixed. Recent research (Kerr,
Nanda and Rhodes-Kropf 2014; Ewens, Nanda, and Rhodes-Kropf forthcoming) suggests
that the main impact of a reduction in c has been in increasing the number of entrepreneurs
financed. However investors have reduced the amount of funding to individual entrepreneurs
at the initial stage and now wait for more information about future prospects of the invest-
23A down round is defined as a financing round with a lower share price than the previous round.
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ment before committing more resources.
1.6.2 Non-Monetary Rewards
Our model has so far interpreted X as monetary payments made from the principal to
the agent. However in a lot of settings, especially within organizations, ability to exchange
money is often limited24. Similarly, founders are often rewarded for success not via monetary
bonuses or cash flow rights but via greater control rights. To capture this in our model, we
can also interpret X in our model as promised continuation utilities instead of monetary
bonuses. Let f(X) denote the cost to the principal of providing continuation utility X to
the agent. Thus now success after s failures results in the agent receiving Xsk as before but
the principal’s payoff is given by R f(Xsk). If we assume that f(X) is an increasing convex
function of X, then the expression obtained for Xsk in proposition 1 remains unchanged.
Further the results for the optimal trials as well as the comparative statics results too remain
qualitatively similar. Thus our model can be widely applied to settings even where monetary
rewards are not available.
1.6.3 Private Observability and Disclosure
In our model, success in a project was immediately observed by the principal. Suppose
instead that the outcome in a project is privately observed by the agent but can be verifiably
disclosed. However if success is not immediately disclosed, then they are lost. Further,
assume that the principal’s payoff from project success obtains here only when the agent
discloses it. Then one question that might be of interest is under the optimal contract found
above, does the agent have enough incentive to disclose the success? The answer is yes, and
24The restriction on the use of monetary rewards is a common feature in the delegation literature.
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one can see it in the context of the two trial example. Suppose the agent implements the
first trial in period t and obtains a success. In case he reveals the success, he gets a payoff
of b+X02. However, if he chooses to hide the success, then he moves on to the second trial.
Having received success, the agent knows that he is a high ability type for sure while the
belief about his ability based on public history is given by ↵1. Hence following the logic
for the two trial case, he will indeed choose to wait for the good project to come before
choosing to implement a project. His payoff in this case is given by b + ✓(b +  X12). Since
X02 > X12 + b, we obtain
b+X02 > b+ b+X12
> b+ ✓(b+  X12)
and hence the agent will choose to disclose success as soon as he obtains one.
1.7 Conclusion
This paper studied a dynamic principal-agent model for experimentation in which the agent
is financed to work on projects and we learn about the agent’s ability through observing
his performances in the projects. Performance also depends on the quality of the projects
implemented; this quality is private information for the agent who is biased towards imple-
mentation. We identified the sources of rents received by the agent in this setting and showed
that the optimal bonus structure has payments for success decreasing in the number of past
failures. The optimal amount of funding to be made available for the agent for implementing
projects is determined by comparing the information received by the principal as a result of
higher number of observations and the higher rents to be paid to the agent as a consequence
of increasing the number of observations.
There are some questions related to the issues analyzed in the paper that may be of
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interest for future research. One possibility is to analyze more general reward structure for
instance by allowing the principal to contract on a richer set of variables, for example time or
periods in which no project is implemented. Another interesting question to study is what
happens in the absence of commitment power on behalf of the principal. Finally, it could
also be interesting to study the dynamics of the relationship in a multi-stage interaction
between the principal and the agent - where performance in a stage has implications for the
incentive structure in later stages. These remain for future research.
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1.9 Appendix: Proofs
1.9.1 Proof of Proposition 1:
Fix k, the maximum number of failures permitted. We are interested in characterizing
the bonus scheme (Xsk)s=0,1,...k 1 that maximizes the principal’s profit and also ensures that
the agent chooses to implement the project if and only if it is a good project.
The proof is divided into the following steps. We first study a relaxed problem by re-
stricting the agent’s off path strategies to have only one deviation - that is the agent can
only deviate once but from then on will choose to implement projects if and only if they
are good projects. Since the bonus contracts are such that they act as incentives to all
deviations, it has to be true that they prevent the agent from such deviations. We then
show that if the only off path strategies available to the agent are these deviations, then the
incentive compatibility condition for the bad projects have to hold with equality, otherwise
the principal can change bonuses to increase profit. Based on that, we obtain a difference
equation linking Xsk and Xs+1k as well as a boundary solution for Xk 1k. This gives us a
solution for Xsk as stated in the proposition. We finally show that the Xsk we found by
restricting the agent’s off-path strategy to one deviations are enough to deter the agent from
more complex off-path strategies involving multiple deviations.
*Principal’s problem
The principal’s expected profit under an incentive compatible contract that has the agent
implementing project if and only if it is a good project is given by







We see in the above expression that the each of the Xsk enter negatively in the principal’s
profit - hence if the principal can reduce any Xsk without violating the limited liability or
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any of the incentive compatibility constraints she would do so.
. The principal’s problem is to chose (Xsk)s=0,1...k 1 and (Vk(m, s))m=0,1..s;s=0,1..k 1 to
maximize profit subject to the incentive compatibility conditions and the limited liability.












subject to incentive compatibility for good projects (IC-G)
b+ ↵m Vk(m, s) + (1  ↵m ) Vk(m+ 1, s+ 1)    Vk(m, s)
incentive compatibility for bad projects (IC-B)
 Vk(m, s)   b+  Vk(m, s+ 1)
and limited liability (LL)
Xsk   0
and Vk(m, s) is defined by:
Vk(m, s) = max
1Gms,1BGms,1Bms,1Gms+1BGms1
{p[1Gms(b+ ↵m Xsk
+(1  ↵m ) Vk(m+ 1, s+ 1))
+1BGms(1  1Gms)(b+  Vk(m, s+ 1))
+(1  1BGms)(1  1Gms) Vk(m, s)]
+(1  p)[1Bms(b+  Vk(m, s+ 1))
+(1  1Bms) Vk(m, s)]}
where 1Gms is an indicator function which takes value = 1 if the agent selects the good
project if it is available and 0 otherwise. Similarly 1BGms stands for the indicator function
for the agent’s choice regarding bad projects if a good project is available while 1Bms stands
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for the indicator function for the agent’s choice regarding bad projects if a good project is
not available.
Suppose the number of public failures is s out of which m failures were in good projects.
We define V Tk (m, s) as the expected profit of the agent if he implements the project if and
only if it is a good project from then on.
Then V Tk (m,m) satisfies the following recurrence relation:
V Tk (m,m) = p(b+ ↵m Xmk + (1  ↵m ) V Tk (m+ 1,m+ 1)) + (1  p) V Tk (m,m)
= ✓(b+ ↵m Xmk + (1  ↵m ) V Tk (m+ 1,m+ 1))







We can similarly get an expression for V T (m,m+ 1) which is given by
V Tk (m,m+ 1) = p(b+ ↵m Xm+1k + (1  ↵m ) V Tk (m+ 1,m+ 2)) + (1  p) V Tk (m,m+ 1)
= ✓(b+ ↵m Xm+1k + (1  ↵m ) V Tk (m+ 1,m+ 2))







*Restriction to one-period deviations:
We start out by restricting the agent to one-period deviations. That is only once will
he deviate from the principal’s prescribed strategy and from then on he will select the to
implement the project if and only if it is a good project. Since the agent is restricted to one-
period deviations, the incentive compatibility constraints are that for each of s = 0, 1...k  1
the following inequalities need to hold true.
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b+ ↵s Xsk + (1  ↵s ) V Tk (s+ 1, s+ 1)    V Tk (s, s) (IC-G-O-s)
b+  V Tk (s, s+ 1)   V Tk (s, s) (IC-B-O-s)
The top inequality (IC-G-O-s) says that the agent prefers to implement a good project
if a good project is available. The bottom inequality (henceforth referred to IC-B-O-s) says
the payoff from not implementing a project is greater than implementing a bad project.
* IC-G-O-s is always satisfied
We first note that the incentive compatibility condition for the good project is always
satisfied. To see this, we observe that
 V Tk (s, s) =  ✓(b+ ↵s Xsk + (1  ↵s ) V Tk (s+ 1, s+ 1))
< (b+ ↵s Xsk + (1  ↵s ) V Tk (s+ 1, s+ 1))
since 0 <  , ✓ < 1.
*Xsk > 0 for all s
We next observe that Xsk > 0 for all s. To show this we use a induction argument. That
is, we start by showing that this is true for Xk 1k > 0 and Xk 2k > 0 and then show that if
Xm+1k > 0, then Xmk > 0.
The incentive compatibility condition for the bad project when beliefs are ↵k 1 is given
by
 V Tk (k   1, k   1)   b
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However we note that
V Tk (k   1, k   1) = ✓(b+ ↵k 1 Xk 1k)
Hence we get
Xk 1k   b(1   )
 ↵k 1 p
> 0.
Consider s = k   2. The incentive compatibility condition for the bad project when
beliefs are ↵k 1 is given by
 V Tk (k   2, k   2)   b+  V Tk (k   2, k   1)
) V Tk (k   2, k   2)  V Tk (k   2, k   1)  
b
 
Using the expressions for V T (m,m) and V T (m,m+1), the LHS can be simplified to give
V Tk (k   2, k   2)  V Tk (k   2, k   1) = ✓{↵k 2 (Xk 2k  Xk 1k)}
+✓2 (1  ↵k 2 ){b+ ↵k 1 Xk 1k}
This allows us to obtain
✓↵k 2 Xk 2k   [ b
 




  ✓2 (1  ↵k 2 )] + ✓↵k 2 Xk 1k[1  ✓ (1   )]
> 0
where the second line follows from using Bayes’ rule on ↵k 2. The third line follows from
observing that each of b > 0, 1    ✓2 (1  ↵k 2 ) > 0 and ✓↵k 2 Xk 1k[1  ✓ (1   )] > 0 .
General induction step: Assume that each of Xk 1k, Xk 2k...Xm+1k > 0. We now show
that this implies Xmk > 0. The incentive compatibility condition for bad projects when
beliefs are ↵s is given by
 V Tk (s, s)   b+  V Tk (s, s+ 1)
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We can follow similar steps as above and show that





✓k s k s 1(1  ↵s )(1  ↵s+1 )...(1  ↵k 2 )↵k 1 b
Here Am is the coefficient for Xm and is given by
Am = ✓
m s+1 m s{(1  ↵s )(1  ↵s+1 )...(1  ↵m 1 )↵m 
 ✓m s m s 1{(1  ↵s )(1  ↵s+1 )...(1  ↵m 2 )↵m 1 
= ✓m s+1 m s{(1  ↵s )(1  ↵s+1 )...(1  ↵m 2 )↵m 1(1   ) 
 ✓m s m s 1{(1  ↵s )(1  ↵s+1 )...(1  ↵m 2 )↵m 1 
= ✓m s m s 1{(1  ↵s )(1  ↵s+1 )...(1  ↵m 2 )↵m 1 (✓ (1   )  1)
< 0
Thus we get that
✓↵s Xsk   b[1
 
  ✓k s k s 1(1  ↵s )(1  ↵s+1 )...(1  ↵k 2 )↵k 1 b]





where the last equality follows from the observation that b > 0, Xm+1k, ...Xk 1k > 0 (from
the induction step) as well as the coefficients on b,Xs+1k....Xk 1k are all positive. Hence we
get that Xsk > 0.
* All IC-B-O-s hold with equality
We now argue that all IC-B-OS need to hold with equality.
The argument is by contradiction. Let s be the first instance whereby the inequality is
strict that is,
 V Tk (s, s) > b+  V
T
k (s, s+ 1)
and
 V Tk (m,m) = b+  V
T
k (m,m+ 1)
for all 0  m < s.
Rewrite using the definition of V Tk (m,m) and V Tk (m,m+ 1)
 V Tk (s, s) > b+  V
T
k (s, s+ 1)
as
✓(b+ ↵s Xsk + (1  ↵s ) V Tk (s+ 1, s+ 1)) > b+  V Tk (s, s+ 1)
We observe that neither V Tk (s + 1, s + 1) nor V Tk (s, s + 1) depend on Xsk. Hence it is
possible to reduce Xsk by a small amount and still have the inequality holding. Since the
principal’s profit is decreasing in Xsk, such an adjustment increases the principal’s profit
and hence it contradicts Xsk being a part of the optimal bonus structure.
It remains to argue that none of the other constraints are violated as a result of this
change in Xsk. we observe that the expressions for V Tk (m,m) as well as V Tk (m,m + 1) are
not dependent on Xsk where m > s. Hence changing Xsk has no impact on any of the
inequalities for s+ 1, s+ 2...k   1.
What about the incentive constraints for m < s? We know that for all such m the
following relation holds.
 V Tk (m,m) = b+  V
T
k (m,m+ 1)
Reducing Xs by ✏ decreases  V Tk (m,m) by ✏{✓s m s m 1(1 ↵m )...(1 ↵s 1 )↵s  while
decreases  V Tk (m,m+ 1) by ✏{✓s m 1 s m 2(1  ↵m )...(1  ↵s 2 )↵s 1 . Observe that
(1  ↵s 1 )↵s = (1   )↵s 1
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and hence
(1  ↵m )...(1  ↵s 1 )↵s  = (1  ↵m )...(1  ↵s 2 )↵s 1 (1   ).
Thus the fall in  V Tk (m,m) is smaller than the  V Tk (m,m+1) and hence the incentive com-
patibility constraint for bad project continues to hold.
*Recurrence relation:










The IC-B-O-k   1 gives us
 V Tk (k   1, k   1) = b
) ✓ (b+ ↵k 1 Xk 1,k) = b






To prove the recurrence relation we use induction on s.
For s = k   2, the IC-B-OS gives us
 V Tk (k   2, k   2) = b+  V Tk (k   2, k   1)
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This can be rewritten as
 p(b+ ↵k 2 Xk 2 + (1  ↵k 2 ) V Tk (k   1, k   1)) = b(1    +  p) +
 V Tk (k   2, k   1)((1    +  p)
To simplify the above expression, we observe
V Tk (k   2, k   1)(1    +  p) = p(b+ ↵k 2 Xk 1k)
and the IC-B-O-k   1 gives us
 V Tk (k   1, k   1) = b
Thus we get,







which verifies the recurrence equation above for s = k   2.
We now assume that the recurrence relation holds for s+1, s+2..., k  2, k  1 and show
that it holds for Xsk as well.
The IC-B-O-s gives us
 V Tk (s, s) = b+  V
T
k (s, s+ 1)
We observe that
V Tk (s, s) = ✓(b+ ↵s Xsk + (1  ↵s ) V Tk (s+ 1, s+ 1))
Hence
 ✓(b+ ↵s Xsk + (1  ↵s ) V Tk (s+ 1, s+ 1)) = b+  V Tk (s, s+ 1)
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Multiplying throughout by 1    +  p and simplifying we get,
 p↵s Xsk = b(1   ) + (1    +  p) V Tk (s, s+ 1)
  2p(1  ↵s )V Tk (s+ 1, s+ 1)
We see that
(1    +  p)V Tk (s, s+ 1) = p[b+ ↵s Xs+1k
+p(1  ↵s ) V Tk (s+ 1, s+ 2)]
Inserting this in the above equation we get,
 p↵s Xsk = b(1   ) +  [pb+ p↵s Xs+1k +
+p(1  ↵s )( V Tk (s+ 1, s+ 2)   V Tk (s+ 1, s+ 1))]
We know that
 V Tk (s+ 1, s+ 1) = b+  V
T
k (s+ 1, s+ 2)
This gives us
 p↵s Xsk = b(1   ) +  [pb+ p↵s Xs+1k
 p(1  ↵s )b]






which proves the recurrence relation.
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*Deriving the formula stated in the proposition











+Xs+2k + b+ b






* Showing this is sufficient to deter more complex off path strategies for the
agent
We now verify that (Xsk)s=0,1..k 1 we found above is sufficient to guarantee that the agent
won’t want to deviate from the prescribed strategy even if he had access to more complex
strategies than one deviations.
The idea is to use induction to show that (Xsk)s=0,1..k 1 is enough to prevent the agent
from taking up bad projects regardless of the beliefs of the agent and the principal - that is
we show that
 Vk(m, s)   b+  Vk(m, s+ 1).
where m = 0, 1...s and s = 0, 1...k   1.
Note that it suffices to make sure that the incentive compatibility condition for the bad
project holds since in that case, there is no gain to choosing not to implement a project
when the project available is good as in the next period the agent’s payoff is going to be the
same as the previous period but now discounted.
Fix s = k   1. We want to show that for m = 0, 1...k   1
 Vk(m, k   1)   b.
One possible strategy for the agent is that he selects not to implement a project if the
project available is bad and implement the good project if it is available. Since Vk(m, k  1)
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is the maximum payoff possible, it has to be true that Vk(m, k   1) gives a weakly higher
payoff than following the above strategy that is
 Vk(m, k   1)    ✓(b+ ↵m Xk 1k)
Since m  k   1, we get that ↵m   ↵k 1 and hence










1    +  p
 p
= b
where the last line follows from noting ✓ ⌘ p1  (1 p) .
Fix s = k   2. We want to show that for m = 0, 1...k   2
 Vk(m, k   2)   b+  Vk(m, k   1).
To reduce notation, we are going to refer to Vk(m, k   2) ⌘ Vm,k 2 and so on for the
remaining part of this proof. One possible strategy for the agent is that he selects the safe
project if the risky project is bad and the risky project if it is a good project. Since Vm,k 2
is the maximum payoff possible, it has to be true that Vm,k 2 gives a weakly higher payoff
than following the above strategy that is
Vm,k 2   ✓(b+ ↵m Xk 2k + (1  ↵m ) Vm+1,k 1).
Hence it is enough to show that
 (b+ ↵m Xk 2k + (1  ↵m ) Vm+1,k 1)   1
✓
(b+  Vm,k 1)
Simplifying the expression we get,












Vm,k 1 = ✓(b+ ↵m Xk 1k)
Using the above two equalities to simplify the previous inequality










+  ↵m b+ (1  ↵m ) 2Vm+1,k 1   b
✓













  1] +  (1  ↵m )[ Vm+1,k 1   b]   0
But m  k   2 which gives us ↵m   ↵k 2 and we also get from the previous step that






  1] +  (1  ↵m )[ Vm+1,k 1   b]   0
and hence
 V (m, k   2)   b+  V (m, k   1).
We now want to show that if for all m = 0, 1...r and r = s+ 1, s+ 2...k   1
 V (m, r)   b+  V (m, r + 1).
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then the following relation holds for all m = 0, 1....s:
 V (m, s)   b+  V (m, s+ 1).
We proceed similarly as before. We know that
Vm,s   ✓(b+ ↵m Xs + (1  ↵m ) Vm+1,s+1).
Hence it is enough to show that
 (b+ ↵m Xs + (1  ↵m ) Vm+1,s+1)   1
✓
(b+  Vm,k 1)
which is the same as showing





We can use the induction assumption to get
Vm,s+1 = ✓(b+ ↵m Xsk + (1  ↵m )Vm+1,s+2)
and also










  1] +  (1  ↵m )[ Vm+1,s+1   b   Vm+1,s+2]   0
We get ↵m↵s  1   0 since m  s and also  Vm+1,s+1 b  Vm+1,s+2 > 0 from the induction






  1] +  (1  ↵m )[ Vm+1,s+1   b   Vm+1,s+2]   0
and this concludes the induction argument.
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1.9.2 Proof of Lemma 1






The lemma follows from observing that each of the terms above are decreasing in k. We
note that   as well as ✓ lie between 0 and 1. Hence ✓k+1 and  k are both decreasing in k.




also lies in between 0 and 1 and hence increasing k multiplies this with a term which is
between 0 and 1 and thus reduces it further.
From Bayes’ rule we get,
↵k =
(1   )k↵0
(1   )k↵0 + (1  ↵0) .
and thus ↵k is a decreasing function of k.
Finally
 Xkk+1 =  b(1   )
  ↵kp
is also decreasing in k since ↵k is decreasing in k.
1.9.3 Proof of Lemma 2












is positive and is also increasing in k since ↵k is decreasing in k. Hence increasing k leads
to an increase in the marginal cost - first, each of the terms above increase due to ↵k being a
decreasing function of k and second, a positive term gets added since we are summing from
1 to k.










Using the definitions of marginal benefit and marginal cost as defined in the text, we can
see that this can be written as
4⇧k ⌘ MBSBk  MCSBk
Lemma 1 says thatMBSBk is decreasing in k while lemma 2 says thatMCSBk is increasing
in k. Thus we get that 4⇧k is decreasing in k.
As we increase k, ↵k (R  Xkk+1)  c becomes negative for some finite k which implies
that the “marginal benefit” becomes negative for some finite k. The “marginal cost” on
the other hand is always positive and is strictly increasing. Assumption 2 guaranteed that
MBSB0 > 0 = MC
SB
0 which suggested that some experimentation is optimal in the second
best. As we increase k, there exists a value of k, say k⇤ for which MBSBk⇤   MCSBk⇤ and
MBSBk⇤+1 < MC
SB
k⇤+1. The optimal number of trials is given by k⇤. To see this, note that
if k > k⇤, the principal can increase expected payoff by reducing k since at such a k,
MBSBk < MC
SB
k . However if k < k⇤, then MBSBk > MCSBk and hence the principal can
increase expected payoff by increasing k.
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1.9.5 Proof of Proposition 3
In the complete information benchmark, there are no bonuses paid. Hence MCCIk = 0






Since Xkk+1 > 0 we see that MBCIk > MBSBk . Thus in the complete information
benchmark, both “marginal benefit” is higher and the “marginal cost” is lower compared
to the second best. Hence the optimal of trials will be higher as well. Note that even if
MBCIk > MB
SB
k it is still true that MBCIk is decreasing in k - the argument is similar to
that presented in the proof of Lemma 2 - and hence experimentation is terminated after a
finite number of failures even in the complete information benchmark.
1.9.6 Proof for the Comparative Statics
Comparative statics with respect to ↵0
Lemma A.5.1: MBSBk is increasing in ↵0 for all k for which MBSBk > 0.





















(1  ↵m )↵k  = ↵0(1   )k 
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and hence is increasing in ↵0.
From equation (1), we see that ↵k is also increasing in ↵0.
Finally
 Xkk+1 =  b(1   )
  ↵kp
is increasing in ↵0 since ↵k is increasing in ↵0. Thus [
Qk 1
m=0(1  ↵m )][↵k (R  Xkk+1)]
is increasing in ↵0.
Next we observe that
k 1Y
m=0
(1  ↵m ) = 1  ↵0 + ↵0(1   )k
Taking derivative of this expression with respect to ↵0, we get  1+ (1   )k < 0 - henceQk 1
m=0(1 ↵m ) is decreasing in ↵0which implies that  
Qk 1
m=0(1 ↵m )c is increasing in ↵0.
Thus both of the components in the expression for MBSBk is increasing in ↵0 which gives us
the result.
Lemma A.5.2: Fix k   1. An increase in ↵0 can lead to a increase in MCSBk .














The portion that is dependent on ↵0 is given by ↵0(1 + (1  ) ↵k p). The derivative of this
expression with respect to ↵0 is given by







which can be positive - hence an increase in ↵0 can lead to a increase in MCSBk .
Alternatively observe that for   = 1, MCSBk simplifies to
Pk
s=1 ↵0(1    )s 1 b which is
an increasing function of ↵0.
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Lemma A.5.3 : An increase in ↵0 leads to an increase in the expected payoff for the
principal.
The principal’s expected profit for k trials is given by







Fix k. Then an increase in ↵0 leads to an increase in the ⇧k. The proof is similar to
showing that the “marginal benefit” is an increasing function of ↵0(Lemma A.5.2). The only
difference is we have Xsk where s = 0, 1...k 1 in place of Xkk+1. However if we hold fixed k,
then Xsk is a decreasing function of ↵0 just as Xkk+1 is decreasing function of ↵0 and hence
analogous arguments hold.
Lemma A.5.4 : An increase in ↵0 leads to an increase in the number of trials in the
second best.
Define k⇤(↵0)+1 as the optimal number of trials in the second best when initial prior
about the agent being of high ability is given by ↵0.
We have ⇧k⇤(↵0)+1   ⇧k⇤(↵0) ⌘ 4⇧k⇤(↵0)   0 , since k⇤(↵0) + 1 is the optimal number of
trials when prior is given by ↵0. Using the expressions for MBSBk⇤(↵0) and MC
SB
k⇤(↵0), we can
rewrite this condition as
✓k
⇤(↵0)+1 k




✓s s 1↵0(1   )s 1 (Xs 1 k⇤(↵0)  Xs 1 k⇤(↵0)+1)   0
Since Xkk+1 = b(1  ) ↵k p and Xs 1 k   Xs 1 k+1 =  b  
b(1  )
 ↵k p




















✓s s 1(1   )s 1b > 0.
We can rewrite 4⇧k⇤(↵0) as
4⇧k⇤(↵0) = ✓k⇤(↵0)+1 k⇤(↵0)↵0(1   )k⇤(↵0) R















































Hence an increase in ↵0 increases 4⇧k⇤(↵0). Since 4⇧k⇤(↵0)   0, this implies that an
increase in prior leads to an increase in the number of trials (from proposition 2).
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Comparative statics with respect to c
Lemma A.5.5: MBSBk is decreasing in c and MCSBk is independent of c. Hence an
increase in c leads to a decrease in the number of trials.




✓s s 1↵0(1   )s 1 (b+ b(1   )
 ↵k p
)






is clearly a decreasing function of c for a given value of k.
The second part of the lemma is a consequence of proposition 2.
Lemma A.5.6: An increase in c leads to a decrease in the expected payoff of the prin-
cipal.
Let cH > cL and let k⇤(c) denote the optimal number of trials when cost of implement-
ing a project is given by c. Let ⇧k(c) denote the principal’s expected payoff from a k-trial
contract when the cost of implementing project is c. We observe that







Holding fixed k, we observe that⇧k(c) is a decreasing function of c.
From Lemma A.5.6, k⇤(cL)   k⇤(cH).
Next observe that ⇧k⇤(cL)(cL)   ⇧k⇤(cH)(cL), since k⇤(cL) denote the optimal number of
trials when cost of implementing a project is given by cL.
Thus we get ⇧k⇤(cL)(cL)   ⇧k⇤(cH)(cL)   ⇧k⇤(cH)(cH) which concludes the proof.
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Chapter 2
Informal Risk Sharing and Index
Insurance: Theory with Experimental
Evidence
Francis Annan and Bikramaditya Datta 1
1We appreciate guidance and support from Patrick Bolton, Emily Breza, Christian Gollier, Wojciech
Kopczuk, Dan Osgood, Bernard Salanié and seminar participants in the Applied Micro Theory and Financial
Economics colloquiums at Columbia University. All remaining errors are ours.
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“...and when basis risk is large, having an informal network can help by
providing insurance against basis risk. Thus the presence of informal
risk sharing actually increases demand for index-based insurance in the
presence of basis risk...” -- World Development Report (2014)
2.1 Introduction
The business of agriculture is inherently risky, particularly for the poor, due to a myriad
of unpredictable weather and climate events. Recently, innovative index-based weather in-
surance has emerged as a way to help society insure against weather related events.2 A
standard index-based contract pays out when some constructed-index falls below or above
a given non-manipulable threshold.3
The justification for index insurance is that it overcomes several market frictions e.g.,
moral hazard, that plague traditional indemnity-based insurance and financial instruments.
Index-based insurance differs in the sense that the contractual terms (premiums and payouts)
are based on publicly observable and non-manipulable index (local weather). However, this
innovation comes with a cost: “basis risk”. In particular, there is a potential mismatch
between the payouts triggered by the local weather and the actual losses associated with
weather realizations of the insurance policy holder. This mismatch or “basis risk” arises
because weather realized on an individual farm unit may not perfectly correlate with the local
weather index—whose construction is typically based on observations recorded at weather
2The design and coverage for index-based weather insurance can be wide ranging. Hazell et al. (2010)
cites at least 36 pilot index insurance projects that were underway in 21 developing countries. Examples
include: India–rainfall insurance (Mobarak and Rosenzweig 2012; Cole et al. 2013); Ethiopia–rainfall (Hazell
et al. 2010; McIntosh et al. 2013; Duru 2016); China–drought and extreme temperature (Hazzel et al. 2010);
Mexico–drought and excess moisture (Hazell et al. 2010); Ghana–rainfall (Karlan et al. 2014); Kenya and
Ethiopia–“livestock” weather-insurance (Jensen et al. 2014).
3See Carter et al. (2017) for a recent survey about index insurance in developing countries.
60
stations that surround the policy holder.4
Empirical studies about weather index-based insurance are growing (e.g., Cai et al. 2009;
Giné and Yang 2009; Cole et al. 2013; Karlan et al. 2014), which in turn have noted
two fundamental puzzles. The first is that, demand for index products has been lower
than expected. The second is that, the demand seems to be especially low from the most
risk averse consumers. Despite its promise, scaling up index insurance will require our
understanding about the various constraints to its take-up. Several candidate reasons for
the low demand have been offered including: financial illiteracy, lack of trust, poor marketing,
credit constraints, present bias, complexity of index contracts, “basis risk” and price effects.
Another suggested explanation for the thin index insurance market in poor populations is
pre-existing informal risk-sharing arrangements. Indeed, the extent to which informal risk-
sharing networks affect the demand for index-based insurance remains an open question, both
empirically and theoretically. In this paper, we focus on microfounded reasons underlying
the relation between informal risk schemes and formal index insurance. Specifically, we ask:
When does an informal risk sharing scheme impede or support the take-up of formal index
insurance? We analyze this question in an environment where an individual endogenously
chooses to join an informal group and make purchase decisions about index insurance. Our
analysis show that the presence of an individual in a risk sharing arrangement reduces his
risk aversion — a phenomenon we term “Effective Risk Aversion”. The paper documents
that “Effective Risk Aversion” is a paramount statistic that underlies individual’s purchase
decisions about index-based insurance.
Appealing to “Effective Risk Aversion”, it is shown that informal schemes may either
reduce or increase the take-up of index insurance. The main intuition follows from the
simple observation that in the presence of a risk-sharing arrangement, an individual’s risk
tolerance is higher.5 This has two implications for the take-up of index insurance. First,
4Satellite measurements are used in some cases (e.g., Carter et al. 2017; IRI 2013). Even so, the
individual weather realizations is not perfectly correlated with the satellite index.
5This intuition is comparable to Itoh (1993), who studies optimal incentive contracts in a group. He
shows that side contracts can serve as mutual insurance for members in a group and can induce effort at
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the individual being more risk-tolerant makes him less willing to buy insurance. Second, the
individual becomes more tolerant to the basis risk, and so is more likely to take-up. These
two forces have opposite effects on the decision to purchase index insurance. Consider the
case of a highly risk averse individual who will not buy index insurance if acting alone because
of his sensitivity to basis risk. Being in a group reduces his risk aversion “effectively” making
him more tolerant towards basis risk and thus more likely to purchase index insurance. Now
consider the case of an individual with intermediate risk aversion who would buy index
insurance if acting alone. The presence of informal insurance may crowd out his take-up for
index insurance due to his lower willingness to pay. Our analysis thus has implications for
informal schemes acting as a substitute or complement to index insurance.
Several testable hypotheses emerge from our theoretical analysis, which are useful for
the design of index insurance contracts and understanding the development or commercial
success of such innovative financial products. We develop a tractable empirical framework
to investigate these hypotheses using data from a panel of field experimental trials in rural
India. First, we provide empirical evidence that the overall effect of informal risk-sharing on
the take-up of index insurance is ambiguous. There is evidence that informal risk sharing
schemes may support take-up, finding that when downside basis risk is high, risk-sharing
increases the index demand by approximately 13 to 40 percentage points. In addition,
we provide evidence that the existence of risk-sharing arrangement makes individuals more
sensitive to price changes, with an estimated increased elasticity of about 0.34.
Finally, we show that an increase in the size of risk-sharing groups decreases take-up.
This effect is stronger once we have conditioned on basis risk – a counter force. Strikingly,
this result stand in contrast to standard information diffusion models, in which an increase
in exposed group size should facilitate uptake of index insurance (e.g., Jackson and Yariv
2010; Banerjee et al. 2013). For example, Banerjee et al. (2013) show that information
passage or diffusion within a social network increases the likelihood of participation in a
a cheaper cost when members of the group can monitor each other’s effort by coordinating their choice of
effort. While Itoh (1993) looks at effort decisions, we analyze insurance decisions.
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microfinance program across 43 villages in South India. Similarly, Cole, Tobacman and
Stein (2014) attributed the observed increase in take-up of index insurance to information
generated by village-wide insurance payouts. Our analysis documents that the effective
reduction in risk aversion following individuals’ exposure to risk-sharing group treatments
explains the findings.
Our paper is related to the broader literatures on risk sharing (e.g., Itoh 1993; Townsend
1994; Munshi 2011; Munshi and Rosenzweig 2009 and many subsequent others), take-up of
index insurance (e.g., Giné, Townsend and Vickery 2008; Mobarak and Rosenzweig 2012;
Cole et al. 2013; Cole, Stein and Tobacman 2014; Karlan et al. 2014; Clarke 2016; Casaburi
and Willis 2017) and the linkages between informal institutions and formal markets (e.g.,
Arnott and Stiglitz 1991; Kranton 1996; Duru 2016). Clarke (2016) studies the relation
between individual risk aversion and the take-up of index insurance. He finds that demand is
hump-shaped with demand for the index being higher in the intermediate risk averse region.
Unlike Clarke (2016), we incorporate pre-existing risk-sharing arrangements to study their
effect on the take-up.
Perhaps, most related is Mobarak and Rosenzweig (2012), who show that the existence
of informal risk-sharing networks increases demand for index insurance, consistent with their
empirical analysis. Our paper is distinct in several ways. Our model is microfounded, allow-
ing for heterogeneity among individuals and endogenous decisions to join risk sharing groups.
Results are based on the notion of “Effective Risk Aversion”—a consequence of efficient risk
sharing. This allows us to identify new channels underlying the effect of informal schemes on
demand for formal index insurance, and provides novel explanations for the two empirical
puzzles based on their interactions. As mentioned previously, one of our channels relates to
the increase in tolerance to basis risk, implying an increase in take-up - this reaffirms previ-
ous results found in Mobarak and Rosenzweig suggesting that informal risk sharing schemes
support take-up of formal index insurance. The additional channel is connected to the in-
crease in tolerance to aggregate gambles, implying a reduced demand for index insurance.
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Finally, we analyze the take-up of index insurance at the extensive margin, unlike Mobarak
and Rosenzweig (2012) and Clarke (2016) who looked at the intensive margin.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model. Results from
several analysis are contained in Sections 3 and 4. Section 5 presents testable hypotheses
from our model and investigates them empirically using field experimental data for a specific
index contract “rainfall insurance”. Section 6 concludes. All formal proofs, tables and figures
are relegated to the Appendix.
2.2 The Model
To investigate the coexistence and interactions between pre-existing (informal) institutional
risk sharing and (formal) index-based insurance, it is crucial to specify preferences, shocks
and informal arrangements in the economy.
Setup
We consider an individual i with absolute risk aversion parameter  i > 0 and receive utility
ui(z) =  e  iz from consuming income z. The individual faces uncertain income realization
according to
zi = wi + hi
where wi and hi denotes the deterministic and the stochastic component of the indi-
vidual’s income. The stochastic component consists of two parts, hi = "i + v: where "i is
the individual’s idiosyncratic risk (e.g., disease shocks), and v is the aggregate shock (e.g.,
drought, rainfall). As we describe below, "i corresponds to the part of the stochastic compo-
nent which can be insured via informal risk-sharing while v corresponds to the portion that
can be insured via formal index insurance. We assume the following
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"i ⇠ N(0,  2i )
v =
8>><>>:
0 with probability 1  p
 L with probability p
Informal risk sharing: There exists a group g that individual i has the option to join.
We think of the group as a representative agent with a CARA utility function and absolute
risk aversion denoted by  g. We denote the income realization of that group as
zg(✏) = wg + hg
where wg and hg ⇠ N(0,  2g) denotes the deterministic and the stochastic component of
the group’s income. In this case, the stochastic component can only be insured through
risk-sharing arrangements. Following Udry (1990), we assume perfect information: group-
idiosyncratic variances are public information and the realizations of shocks are also perfectly
observed by all individuals when they occur in the society. This provides enforcement for
the informal relationships.
Individual i has the choice of entering into a risk-sharing arrangement with the group.
An unmatched individual receives his random income. If the individual joins the group, he
can enter into a binding agreement prior to the realization of their incomes, specifying how
their pooled income is going to be shared. 6
6The model thus reflects several practical contexts including the case where cooperatives buy index
insurance for their members. To illustrate: an index contract package was designed for groundnut farmers in
Malawi for a 1 acre of production. Eligibility requires a farmer to be within 20km of one of the meteorological
stations in the program. This package consists of a loan (of about 4500 Malawi Kwacha or US$35) that
covers the cost of groundnut seed (of about US$25, International Crops Research Institute for the Semi-Arid
Tropics [ICRISAT] bred), the index insurance premium (about US$2), and tax (about US$0.50). After
signing the paperwork, the farmer receives a bag of groundnut seed which is deemed sufficient for 1 acre
of production and an insurance certificate for a payout policy that maxes at the loan size plus interest
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Index Insurance: There are no financial markets allowing any individual to insure him-
self against his idiosyncratic risks. However, with the introduction of index-weather based
insurance it is possible to insure against v. Aggregate shocks can be insured by formal
index-based insurance which is subject to basis risk (e.g., Cole et al. 2013). We model basis
risk as in Clarke (2016):
(~US$7). Prices vary by the weather station and crop. In this program, farmers are organized into joint
liability “groups” of about 10-20 members. Farmers plant the groundnut seed, and then at the end of the
production season provide their yields to the farm association or cooperative, which markets the yields. The
proceeds and insurance payouts are then used to pay for the loan, and any remaining profits are returned to
the farmer–net of any loan deductions. Similar contract developments involving groups decisions are ongoing





































































Where in Table 1: individual i suffers aggregate risk which can take the value 0 with
probability 1  p or  L with probability p. There is also an index which can take the value
1 (i.e., payout) with probability q or 0 (i.e., no payout) with probability 1  q. As usual, the
index may not be perfectly correlated with the aggregate risk and so there are four possible
joint realizations of the aggregate risk and index. In this case, r denotes the probability that
a negative aggregate shock is realized but the index suggests no payouts. This corresponds
to the downside basis risk faced by the consumer if he purchases index insurance. Similarly,
q + r   p corresponds to an upside basis risk where an insured agent does not suffer an
aggregate shock and yet payouts are triggered. Note that both downside and upside basis
risks are increasing in r. We also assume that the index is informative about the aggregate
loss that is Prob(v = 0, I = 0)⇥Prob(v = 1, I = 1) > Prob(v = 0, I = 1)⇥Prob(v = 1, I =
0) which implies that r < p(1  q).
2.3 Demand for Index Insurance: no informal access
Suppose that individual i is faced with the choice of either buying index insurance, denoted
by 1 or not, denoted by 0. We first consider the case where the individual does not have
access to an informal risk-sharing arrangement. In order to determine demand for index
insurance, we compare the certainty equivalents for buying versus not buying the index.
Formally, consider individual i whose income process is given by
z0i (✏) = wi + "i + v
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where the independent shocks are
"i ⇠ N(0,  2i )
v =
8>><>>:
0 with probability 1  p
 L with probability p
If individual does not buy the index: the expected utility of individual i is







2 ([1  p] + pe iL)
For individual i with CARA utility function with income zi, we derive the certainty
equivalent (CEi) according to:
 e  iCEi = E( e  izi)















+ log([1  p] + pe iL)






log([1  p] + pe iL)
If the individual buys insurance he pays a fixed premium ⇡ and receives a stochastic payout
⌘ which depends on the level of coverage and on the value of the index. If the individual
buys index insurance and the Index=1, the insurance company pays the individual  L. For
Index=0, there is no transfer from the insurance company to the individual. Thus, the ac-
tuarially fair premium is q L. Due to loading, administrative costs and lack of competition,
the premium is typically not actuarially fair. This is captured as ⇡ = mq L for m > 1.
If the individual buys insurance, his income process is now given by:
z1i (✏) = w
0 + "i + v0
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where w0 ⌘ wi   ⇡ and v0 ⌘ v + ⌘. Thus v0 and "i are independent and the distribution
of v0 is given by
v0 =
8>>>>>>>>>><>>>>>>>>>>:
0 with probability 1  q   r
 L with probability r
 L with probability q + r   p
 L+  L with probability p  r
So, if the individual buys the index: the expected utility is







2 ([1  q   r] + re iL + [q + r   p]e  i L + [p  r]e  i( L+ L))















+ log([1  q   r] + re iL + [q + r   p]e  i L + [p  r]e  i( L+ L))






log([1  q   r] + re iL + [q + r   p]e  i L + [p  r]e  i( L+ L))
Thus, the individual buys insurance if CE1i   CE0i . Using the expressions for CEs from













log([1  p] + pe iL)
 mq L  1
 i
log([1  q   r] + re iL + [q + r   p]e  i L + [p  r]e  i( L+ L))     1
 i
log([1  p] + pe iL)
  1
 i
log([1  q   r] + re iL + [q + r   p]e  i L + [p  r]e  i( L+ L)) + 1
 i
log([1  p] + pe iL)   mq L
where the second inequality uses w0 ⌘ wi  ⇡. Observe that   1 i log([1  q  r] + re iL +
[q + r   p]e  i L + [p   r]e  i( L+ L)) = CEi(v0) i.e., the CE for individual faced with v0
gamble. Equivalently:  1 i log([1   p] + pe iL) = CEi(v). Thus the individual buys index
insurance if
CEi(v
0)  CEi(v)   mq L
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We obtain the individual’s decision to buy the index in two ways: small losses (analytically)
versus large losses (numerically).
2.3.1 Small Losses:
Let’s suppose losses are small. Then, we can approximate the CEs as follows












where the variances of v and v0 are  2v and  2v0 respectively. This means the individual





v    2v0)   (m  1)q L
Since m > 1, the RHS is always positive. For  2v0    2v the LHS is non-positive and hence
the individual will not buy index insurance.  2v0 captures two parts: reduction in variance
from buying insurance and an increase in variance due to the presence of basis risk. It is
therefore possible for  2v0    2v depending on these effects. However even for  2v0 <  2v the
individual may not buy index insurance for low values of  i. Thus, there exist a threshold
 ⇤ = max(0, 2(m 1)q L
 2v  2v0
) such that the individual with risk aversion parameter  i <  ⇤ will
not buy the index insurance. Since the index insurance is actuarially unfair m > 1 the
individual suffers a reduction in expected income. However, there is a change in variance
from buying index insurance. The individual compares these two forces. If the variance does
not decrease then nobody buys the index. But if the variance decreases, then individuals
with high risk aversion will assign more weight to this reduction in variance; hence will buy
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the index. Whereas for individuals with low risk aversion, this reduction in variance may
not be enough to compensate for the loss in expected income; hence will not buy the index.
The above discussion is summarized in Proposition 1 below
PROPOSITION 1: Consider an individual with CARA utility function and risk aver-
sion parameter  i > 0. Under small losses and actuarially unfair index insurance m > 1, the
following two results hold.
(1) The individual will purchase an index cover   iff 12 i( 
2
v    2v0)   (m  1)q L





So far we have been analyzing the implications of informal arrangements on the decisions
to buy index insurance assuming small losses. In this subsection, we extend the analysis to
the case of large losses. It is still the case that an individual with risk aversion  i if acting
individually chooses to buy the index insurance if
CEi(v
0)  CEi(v)   mq L
which is equivalent to
  1
 i
log([1  q   r] + re iL + [q + r   p]e  i L + [p  r]e  i( L+ L)) + 1
 i
log([1  p] + pe iL)   mq L
We illustrate the condition numerically in Figure 1. The red curve represents the left
side of the inequality that is the difference in the CEs while the green line represents the
right side of the inequality: mq L. The x-axis represents different values for risk aversion,
indicating that individuals with risk-aversion levels in between the two vertical black lines
purchase index insurance. Unlike the case of small loses, the decision to buy index insurance
is bounded between two    thresholds. Within this interval, the above inequality is satisfied
and individuals purchase the index cover. Next, observe that individuals with sufficiently
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high or low risk-aversion will choose not to buy index insurance. The simple intuition is
that high risk-averse individuals do not buy because of the basis risk while low risk-averse
individuals choose not to buy because of loading of premium (m > 1). This is similar to
the findings of Clarke (2016) who examines purchases of index insurance at the intensive
margin.
2.4 Demand for Index Insurance: informal group access
2.4.1 Informal Risk Sharing
This subsection discusses the informal risk sharing arrangements before the introduction
of index insurance. Since our set up has a non-transferable utility (NTU) representation,
we first show that the model has a transferable utility (TU) representation under certainty
equivalents (CE). The set-up is NTU because of the heterogeneity in risk-aversion where one
unit of income yields utility ui(1) =  exp(  i) for an individual i with risk aversion  i, but
utility ug(1) =  exp(  g) 6= ui(1) for a representative agent acting for the group g with risk
aversion  g. We work with certainty equivalent units, which allows for TU representations.
This is stated in the following Lemma.
LEMMA 1: The NTU model has a TU representation, where CEs are transferable across
individuals (i, g).
Next, since CE is transferable, we also have the following lemma.
LEMMA 2: Suppose individual i decides to join the group g and risk is shared efficiently
between them. Then under transferable CEs we can think of the pair (i, g) as a representative
agent with risk aversion parameter  i⇤ where 1 i⇤ =
1
 i
+ 1 g . This implies that  i⇤ < min( i,  g).
Lemma 2 allows us to conveniently analyze the decision of individual i to take index in-
73
surance in the presence of risk sharing arrangements. It also shows that the risk aversion of
the individual i will be effectively lower if he is in a group, as compared to if he was acting
as an individual. The latter is summarized in Definition 1 below.
DEFINITION 1:  i⇤ as “Effective Risk Aversion”: This refers to the risk aversion pa-
rameter for a representative agent i⇤ representing group consisting of (i, g) that shares risk
efficiently.
REMARK: We can now examine whether it is optimal for individual i to join the group g.
To do this we compare the CE of the group if they were sharing risk efficiently to the sum
of CEs for the individual i and group g if they were acting separately. Indeed, joining the
group provide welfare gains to the individual (and the group). The argument is similar to
Wilson (1968). For contradiction: suppose that i and g are un-matched, then i and g can
form a pair where each consumes his income. In this case, each is at least as well-off in the
pair, as compared to remaining unmatched. However, by the mutuality principle, both can
be better-off when in the group. This requires their income shares to rise and fall together
with the independent random part of their incomes. The following lemma formally shows
that if is efficient for i and g to form a pair.
LEMMA 3: Suppose risk is shared efficiently within a group. Then it is efficient for
individual i to join group g.
2.4.2 Extensive Margin 0-1: with informal group access
Consider now the demand for index insurance for the individual who has access to informal
risk-sharing arrangement. From LEMMA 2, this is the same as the demand for index





Thus, we can apply the preceding analysis to evaluate the decision of an individual in a
group to purchase index insurance.
The representative agent’s income process in the absence of index insurance is given by
z0i⇤ = wi + wg + hg + "i + v
If individual does not buy the index: the expected utility of representative agent is







2 ([1  p] + pe i⇤L)
and the certainty equivalent with no index insurance is given by







log([1  p] + pe i⇤L)
Next, if individual buys index insurance, the group’s income process is now given by:
z1i⇤ = w
0 + hg + "i + v0
where w0i⇤ ⌘ wi + wg   ⇡ and v0 ⌘ v + ⌘.
If the individual buys the index: the expected utility of the representative agent is
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log([1  q   r] + re i⇤L + [q + r   p]e  i⇤ L + [p  r]e  i⇤ ( L+ L))
Thus, the individual buys insurance if CE1i⇤   CE0i⇤ which we can rewrite as
CEi⇤(v
0)  CEi⇤(v)   mq L
where   1 i⇤ log([1   q   r] + re i⇤L + [q + r   p]e  i⇤ L + [p   r]e  i⇤ ( L+ L)) = CEi⇤(v0)
and  1 i⇤ log([1  p] + pe i⇤L) = CEi⇤(v).





v    2v0)   (m  1)q L
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The next result evaluates the impact of informal risk sharing arrangement on the take-up
of index insurance.
PROPOSITION 2: Consider an individual with risk aversion parameter  i who joins a
group with parameter  g. Then, under small losses and actuarially unfair index insurance
m > 1, the following results hold.
(1) Independent of his presence in the group, the individual i will not purchase index
insurance if  i <  ⇤.
(2) Independent of his risk aversion parameter  i, the individual i will not purchase index
insurance if  g   ⇤.
(3) However, the individual may buy index insurance if  i    ⇤ and  g    ⇤ are satisfied.
Particularly, he buys the index cover in the presence of the group if  2v0 <  2v and  i⇤ =
 i g
 i+ g
>  ⇤ = max(0, 2(m 1)q L
 2v  2v0
) .
Proposition 2 shows that informal risk-sharing arrangements can impede the discrete (0-1)
take-up of index insurance. The intuition is based on the fact that the “effective” risk aversion
of individuals forming a group are lower than the risk aversion of the individuals if they were
acting individually. Essentially the group lowers the individual’s aversion to risk (Lemma
2) which in turn might move the individual from a purchase zone to the non-purchase zone
based on  ⇤.
2.4.3 The Case of Large Losses
The results from Proposition 2 can be modified to fit the case of large losses. When losses
are small, an individual i0s decision to not buy index insurance remain unchanged in the
presence of informal arrangements. However if losses are large, our theory suggests that
informal insurance might facilitate in taking up of index insurance. This happens for instance
if an individual is initially too risk averse to buy index insurance on his own, however in
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the presence of informal arrangements his effective risk aversion might be such that he
ends up purchasing the index cover. To illustrate, consider Figure 1. An individual with
risk aversion parameter 6 would not have purchased the index insurance if he was acting
individually. However if he pairs with a group that brings his effective risk aversion to the
range (0.8, 4.7), then he chooses to purchase the index cover. We also see that it is possible
that informal insurance acts as a barrier to take up. For example, consider an individual
with risk aversion parameter 3. Acting individually, he will buy the index insurance, however
if the presence of a risk-sharing arrangement reduces his effective risk aversion to below 0.8,
then he will choose not to buy the index insurance. The analysis provides explanations and
predictions for several empirical findings which are discussed in the next section.
2.5 Model-Implications and Experimental Evidence
Our theoretical evaluation of the interaction between informal risk sharing schemes and de-
mand for index insurance provide several testable hypotheses with implications for the design
of index insurance contracts. This section discusses the emerging hypothesis and explores
them empirically combining field experimental data from multiple sources for a specific in-
dex contract “rainfall insurance”. We begin with a discussion of the testable hypotheses, and
then follow this with a description of the data and experimental design. For each hypothesis,
we present the testing procedure and the resulting empirical results.
2.5.1 Discussions, and testable implications
First, why might more risk averse individuals not take up index insurance? Our framework
suggests a plausible answer. Absent risk-sharing arrangements, low take-up among high risk
averse individuals may be due to aversion to basis risk (Clarke 2016). However, another
plausible reason may be due to the presence of informal risk sharing groups (i.e., based on
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our theory, Section 4). The presence of risk sharing groups leads to effective reduction in
an individual’s risk aversion, making him more tolerant towards aggregate risk and more
sensitive to the price of index insurance. For this reason, more risk averse people may end
up not buying index insurance, as compared to an individual with the same risk aversion
parameter who might take it up if the individual was unmatched.
Second, why is the take-up for index insurance unexpectedly low? Possible answers lie in
the role of existing informal arrangements. In particular, (1) When does informal arrange-
ment support the index take up? Our analysis suggests that high risk averse individuals in
risk sharing arrangements containing intermediate risk averse members are more likely to
purchase index insurance. Acting alone, basis risk will act as a disincentive to the take-up
of index insurance; however, the presence of the group makes the individual more tolerant
to basis risk; (2) When does informal pairing not-support index take up? From our anal-
ysis, low to intermediate risk averse individuals that enter any risk sharing group are less
likely to purchase index insurance. Their effective risk aversion is lower, and thus has lower
willingness to pay for index insurance. The above discussions lead to the following sets of
predictions.
Prediction #1: The link between informal risk-sharing and the take of index insurance
is ambiguous. This is because of the existence of the two identifiable forces: sensitivity to
either basis risk or price of the index contract. Ultimately, the overall impact of informal
risk-sharing schemes on the demand for index insurance depends on which of these two forces
dominate.
Prediction #2: Informal risk-sharing is more likely to complement the take-up of index
insurance in regions with high aggregate (especially, if un-insurable by group) and basis
risk. This follows because the presence of an informal risk sharing group helps to make the
individual more tolerant to the basis risk, holding other forces constant. In addition, in the
presence of risk-sharing arrangements, the sensitivity of index demand to price changes is
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higher, as individuals become effectively less risk averse.
Prediction #3: The take-up for index insurance may be higher if the size of the group
is smaller. This is because smaller groups are likely more risk averse, all else equal. For
instance, under small losses (e.g., relative to w and "), villages where there are more informal
transfers, which can be proxied by the number of pairs in our model, are likely to see lower
take-ups once price and basis risk are controlled for. With controls for price effects and basis
risk, individual’s risk aversion from joining the larger group may be effectively lower leading
to less demand for insurance. This prediction contradicts those that connect information
diffusion and group size.
2.5.2 Data and sources
Ideally, we require data about the demand for index insurance contracts, informal risk shar-
ing, a measure of basis risk, insurance premiums, and risk aversion. For this purpose, we
draw on available data sets from a panel of experimental trials that were conducted across
randomly selected rural farming households and villages in Gujarat, India.7 Data on risk
aversion come from Cole et al. (2013), which is based on field experiments across 100 villages
in 2006/2007. The measure of risk aversion follows Binswanger (1980), whereby respondents
are asked to choose among cash lotteries varying in risk and expected return. The lotteries
were played for real money, with payouts between zero and Rs. 110. The lottery choices
are then mapped into an index between 0 and 1, where high values indicate greater risk
aversion.8
7All villages are located within 30km of a rainfall station. Design of rainfall insurance contracts uses
information from these rainfall stations.
8A value 1 is assigned to individuals that choose the safe lottery. For those who choose riskier lotteries,
the [0, 1) mapping indicates the maximum rate at which they are revealed to accept additional risk (standard
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From Cole, Tobacman and Stein (2014), we obtain data about the take-up of index
insurance, premiums, and premium discounts available between 2006-2013 for 60 villages
cumulatively. Most of these villages and households overlap with the 100 villages in Cole et
al. (2013). This allows us to match households and villages between the two data sets. Our
final data are merged from these two sources. We summarize the timeline of the rainfall-index
insurance experiments and the available data in Figure 2 (of the Appendix).
2.5.2.1 Rainfall-index contracts and experimental setting
The specific index insurance contract that we examine is “rainfall insurance” whose payouts
are based on a publicly observable rainfall index. This contract provides coverage against
adverse rainfall events (i.e., covering drought and flood) for the summer (“Kharif”) monsoon
growing season. Design of this contract is based on daily rainfall readings at local rainfall
stations, specifying payouts as a function of cumulative rainfall during fixed time periods
over the entire June 1-August 31 Kharif season. Typically, the maximum possible payout
for a unit-policy is about Rs. 1500. Households have the option to purchase any number of
policies to achieve their desired level of insurance coverage. The contracts are offered and
paid-out year-to-year, whereby a marketing team visits households in the selected sample
each year in April-May to offer the insurance policies. Households are required to opt-in to
re-purchase each year to sustain their coverage.
“Group Identity” as risk-sharing proxy: The marketing teams for rainfall insurance
used multiple strategies to sell the policies. Their strategies include the use of flyers, videos,
and discount coupons, and involved randomization of these three marketing methods at the
household level. More importantly, flyers were randomized along two dimensions with the
aim of testing how formal insurance interacts with informal risk-sharing arrangements (cf:
deviation) in return for higher expected return (  EDrisk ). Additional details are available in Cole et al. (2013).
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Cole et al. 2013). The flyers emphasized and provided cues on “group identity”, which has
been found to be key for informal risk-sharing (Karlan et al., 2009). The treatments for
group identity included:9
Religion (Hindu, Muslim, or Neutral): A photograph on the flyer depicted
a farmer in front of a Hindu temple (Hindu Treatment), a Mosque (Muslim
Treatment), or a neutral building. The farmer has a matching first name,
which is characteristically Hindu, characteristically Muslim, or neutral.
Individual or Group (Individual or Group): In the Individual treat-
ment, the flyer emphasized the potential benefits of the insurance product
for the individual buying the policy. The Group flyer emphasized the value
of the policy for the purchaser’s family.
Note that the use of cues on group identity as a proxy for risk-sharing has been used in
previous literature (e.g., Cole et al. 2013), which we follow here. While such approach may
have the downside of not capturing actual risk-sharing since people generally choose who to
group and share risk with (possibly, over and beyond religious and family lines), it has an
empirical appeal: it allows for randomization of risk-sharing which is extremely useful for
identification purposes, at least, as compared to cases where groups form endogenously and
share risk.
2.5.2.2 Measuring basis risk
Each season, households were asked if they had experienced crop loss due to weather in
the household panel experiments. We combine this with unique market information about
whether the household i located in village v in a contract year t received an insurance payout
9More details of the data and group treatments are available in our two primary sources of data: Cole
et al. (2013); Cole, Tobacman and Stein (2014).
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to define a measure of basis risk
briskDOWNSIDEivt = 1(lossivt > payoutivt)
briskUPSIDEivt = 1(lossivt < payoutivt)
which are indicators that capture the potential mismatch or discrepancy between insur-
ance payouts and the actual crop loss or income loss suffered by the policy holder prior to
the payout decisions. For instance, this may be due to the fact that the measured rainfall
index is imperfectly correlated with rainfall at any individual farm plot. As illustrated,
our measure of basis risk allows for the distinction between upside and downside risks, and
follows directly from previous discussions in Section 2.10
2.5.2.3 Summaries
The summary statistics of all relevant variables in our sample are reported in Table 2. The
first two moments and order statistics of each variable are displayed. As shown, the data
is made up of information about the demand for rainfall-index insurance, premium and
randomized discounts, crop and revenue loss experience of households, treatments for risk-
sharing as proxied by cues on “group identity”, and basis risks, respectively. The overall
data spans 2006-2013, covering 645 households across a pool of 60 villages. Considerable
variations exist among the variables which we shall exploit for identifying variation. Our
main outcome of interest is binary, denoted “Bought”. Bought is defined based on whether
10Since crop losses (but not payouts) are self-reported, there is a potential tendency for households to
misreport, e.g., overstate losses, and thus might impact our measurement of basis risk up/down. To assess
such potential misreporting, we regress households reported-crop loss experience on a vector of seventeen
(17) household characteristics: spanning socio-demographics, educational level, asset holdings, access to
formal insurance, per capita monthly expenditure, risk aversion, and indicators for whether a respondent
has a muslim name and irrigates the farm. Results are reported in Table 15. None of these 17 variables
is statistically significant at conventional levels, an evidence inconsistent with misreporting. The evidence
is more consistent with a reporting behavior whereby crop losses occur due to weather shocks and then
households report them as such. This finding hold across the wide range of model specifications, which differ
based on the included controls.
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households purchased index insurance in given market year. In our sample, about 39% of
households bought rainfall-index insurance over the entire panel period.
The average risk aversion is 0.53 with a standard deviation of about 0.32. The overall
share of households that received cues on Group, Hindu and Muslim treatments are about
4.0%, 2.8% and 2.9%, respectively. Our measure of basis risk that relies on the mismatch
between pre-insurance crop losses and index payouts suggest higher relative frequency for
downside basis risk (25.5%), as compared to upside basis risk (8.2%). For our basis risk
measure that relies on the mismatch between pre-insurance revenue losses11 and index pay-
outs, the relative frequency of downside and upside basis risks are quite close. A visual
illustration for both downside and upside basis risks are shown in Figure 3. Empirical tests
for the various predictions combine these variables with exogenous variations induced by the
random assignment of price discounts and risk-sharing marketing treatments.12
2.5.3 Empirical tests and results
The testing procedure and empirical results are presented in this section. Additional robust-
ness checks on our main results are discussed.
11Revenue is measured for market years in which households reported a crop loss, and captures the
“amount” of crop loss: calculated as the difference between that market year’s agricultural output and the
mean value of output in all previous years where crop loss was not reported.
12Ensuring balance across risk-sharing treatment groups e.g., assignment of group, Hindu and muslim
cues is crucial for the experimental results. We ascertain balance using observable characteristics of the
households. In Table 16 of the Appendix, we test whether the various household characteristics significantly
differ across the risk sharing treatments. The results provide strong evidence in favor of balance (except for
about two variables which are barely significant at 10% level).
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2.5.3.1 Empirical strategy and results: predictions #1 and #2
To test predictions #1 and #2, we estimate a model that links changes in take-up for index
insurance Divt = 1(bought = Y es)ivt to the vector of risk-sharing treatments RShareivt
and their unrestricted interaction with basis risk briskivt and exogenous variation in the
price for insurance Discountivt
Divt = ✓RShareivt ⇥ briskivt +  dDiscountivt + µi +  t + ✏ivt
Divt = ✓RShareivt ⇥Discountivt +  bbriskivt + µi +  t + ✏ivt
where i, v and t index the household, village and market year respectively. This spec-
ification includes a set of unrestricted household dummies, denoted by µi, which capture
unobserved differences that are fixed across households such as access to other forms of in-
surance. The market-year fixed effects,  t control for aggregate changes that are common
across households, e.g. prices, and national policies. Our key parameter of interest ✓ is
identified by household-level exogenous variation in the various treatments for risk-sharing
and their interactions with the two forces: basis risk and insurance premium. Errors are
clustered at the village level to allow for arbitrary correlations.
The results are reported separately for the two measures of basis risk: crop-loss mismatch
with index payouts versus revenue-loss mismatch with index payouts. For the first Equation,
which interacts risk sharing with basis risk, Tables 3 and 4 contain the estimates for crop-
mismatch while Tables 5 and 6 contains the estimates for revenue-mismatch. Columns differ
based on the included risk-sharing treatments and interactions with basis risk, and controls
for premium discount and upside basis risk. In Tables 3 and 5, columns (2)-(4) include the
various interaction terms, while column (1) omits the interactions. However, in Tables 4
and 6, column (1) includes the various interaction terms with basis risk, column (2) adds a
control for premium discount, while column (3) adds controls for both premium discounts
and upside basis risk.
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Downside basis risk is negative and significant at conventional levels, upside basis risk is
significantly positive, and premium discount is significantly positive across all specifications.
The estimated price discount effects range between 0.0032 - 0.0035; with an average estimate
of about 0.0034. An average estimate of 0.0034 implies that a 10 percent decline in the price
of index insurance increases the probability of purchase by 0.034 percentage points, or 0.113
percent of the conditional mean take-up rate (~0.30). The implied elasticity is 0.0113. While
households negative demand-response to downside basis risk is substantial, this is less than
their positive response to upward basis risk. Turning to our key coefficients of interest, there
is evidence that informal risk-sharing significantly supports the take-up of index insurance,
and that when downside basis risk is high risk-sharing increases the index demand by 13.0%
points (column 4; Table 3) to 40.1% points (column 4; Table 6).
Next, for the second Equation, which interacts risk sharing with exogenous changes in
premium, the results for crop-mismatch are contained in Tables 7 and 8, and those for
revenue-mismatch are in Tables 9 and 10. Again, across all model specifications, downside
basis risk is significantly negative, upside basis risk is positive and large, and premium
discount is positive. For our main coefficients of interest, there is evidence that the existence
of risk-sharing arrangement makes individuals more sensitive to price changes since both
the direct and interaction terms on discount are positive. For example, when group cues
are combined with discounts (Table 7; column 4), the sensitivity increases by about 10.1
percentage points which implies an increased elasticity of 0.337.
In addition, there is evidence that informal risk-sharing significantly either support or
not-support the take-up of rainfall-index insurance. For instance, while Group cues has
negative effect on index take-up (column 4; Table 7), Group cues treatment combined with
Muslim cues has a significant positive effect on take-up (column 3; Table 8). However, when
the various risk-sharing cues are combined with premium discount, most of the terms have
significant positive effect on the take-up of insurance.
Taken together, these results (i.e., Tables 3-10) provide evidence that informal risk-
85
sharing has ambiguous effects on index take-up, empirically. With high downside basis
risk, informal networks increase take-up, but under price effects, informal networks may
have negative effect on take-up; making the overall impact of risk-sharing on the take-up of
index insurance ambiguous. As shown in Proposition 2, risk aversion plays a central role
in explaining these effects. Thus, we turn to the role of risk aversion in the subsequent
analysis.13
2.5.3.2 Empirical strategy and results: prediction #2
We modify previous specifications to investigate how risk aversion (effective) interacts with
the two forces: sensitivities to either basis risk or insurance premium
Divt = ✓riskAversionivt ⇥ briskivt +  dDiscountivt + µi +  t + ✏ivt
Divt = ✓riskAversionivt ⇥Discountivt +  bbriskivt + µi +  t + ✏ivt
where all the terms are defined similarly as in previous sections, and errors are clustered
at the village level. The results are reported in Table 11. Columns differ based on the
included interactions with risk aversion. Column (1) uses market year dummies to control
for potential sensitivity to changes in premium, and includes an interaction between basis
risk and risk aversion. This interaction allows us to focus on the response of basis risk to
changes in risk aversion I.e., we ask whether increase in risk aversion alter the demand-
13Since our theoretical analysis relies on CARA (with a simplifying property of no wealth effects), we
examine how sensitive or robust our main results are to potential wealth effects. To do this, we re-estimate
our empirical model with an additional control for households wealth. We used Factor analysis to esti-
mate the wealth of housholds based on eight (8) asset holdings or ownership: 1(Electricity=Yes), 1(Mobile
Phone=Yes), 1(Sew Machine=Yes), 1(Tractor=Yes), 1(Thresher=Yes), 1(Bull cart=Yes), 1(Bicycle=Yes),
and 1(Motorcycle=Yes); where 1(.) is a logical indicator that equals 1 whenever the argument in the bracket
is true, and 0 otherwise. Figure 5 shows the estimated distribution of wealth. The implied results are also
shown in Tables 17 and 18. The estimate on wealth is positive but not significant. However, the estimates for
our key parameter of interest   are similar to the main results (i.e., very close and well within the confidence
intervals of the main estimates).
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response to basis risk. In columns (2)-(3), we directly control for potential sensitivity to
basis risk, and include interactions between premium discounts and risk aversion to evaluate
how households sensitivity to prices respond to changes in risk aversion.14
Note that the direct coefficient on risk aversion is not estimable (but its interaction
with other variables are) since we included household-level dummies which soaks-up any
fixed household-level terms. From column (1), downside basis risk has significant negative
effect on take-up (-12.0% points); its interaction with risk aversion is also negative (but not
significant at conventional levels). This seems to suggest that, after controlling for price
effects, an increase in individual’s risk aversion increases the negative sensitivity of index
take-up to increases in basis risk. The result that basis risk when combined with risk-
sharing cues positively affect take-up (Table 3 and 6; Muslim cues) can be explained by this
negative effect of risk aversion on basis risk . Recall that joining a group effectively reduces
individual’s risk aversion (LEMMA 2).
The results in columns (2)-(3) show that premium discounts have significantly positive
impact on take-up, increasing index take-up by 0.369 to 0.396 percentage points (similar
to previous estimates). The interaction with risk aversion is negative. The negative sign
implies that increasing risk aversion has negative effect on the positive impact of premium
discounts on insurance demand (although not statistically significant) and vice versa. This
likely explains the positive effect of premium discount when combined with the various risk-
sharing cues on index take-up (Tables 7-10), when combined with the result in LEMMA
2.
14There is an empirical appeal to use the observed risk aversion values here (rather than the theory-derived
risk aversion values). The sample is at the individual household level with larger size for the observed values.
We do not have to calculate risk aversion values at the village level–which is an approach we will have take
to obtain the theory-based values. Figure 4 illustrates the distribution of observed vs theory-derived risk
aversion values.
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2.5.3.3 Empirical strategy and results: prediction #3
We evaluate prediction #3 by linking observed changes in take-up for index insurance to a
measure of group-size while controlling for the effect of basis risk and variations in insurance
premium at the village level,
Dvt = ✓GSizevt +  bbriskvt +  dDiscountvt + µv +  t + ✏vt
where group size, GSizevt, is defined as the number of households that received cues
on “group identity” per village. µv are village-level fixed effects, capturing time-invariant
potential unobserved heterogeneity. The results for alternative model specifications are re-
ported in Tables 12-14. Our preferred specification is column (4), which examines the effect
of group size on the demand for index insurance along with full controls for downside basis
risk, upside basis risk and premium discounts. These additional controls are meant to soak-
up household sensitivities to both basis risk and insurance premium within the framework
of our theoretical model.
Consistent with prediction #3, the estimate on group size is negative, statistically sig-
nificant across all specifications, and hold across alternative measures of group size which
are based on the various risk-sharing treatments. Estimates from our preferred specification
suggest that providing cues on “group identity” for an additional household in a village will
result in about 2.8% points decrease in index take-up, all else equal (column 4; Table 12).15
This represents 5.9% reduction in insurance insurance take-up, relative to the conditional
mean defined over the entire sample period. The negative effects of group size on take-up
are much larger in the model specification that controls for only downside basis risk (col-
umn 1). This is expected and can be understood based on our theory: the countervailing
force to reduced index demand is “upside basis risk” when individuals become effectively less
risk averse following more group exposure. Thus, controlling to eliminate this force should
15We examine the sensitivity of our main results to potential wealth effects by including wealth as a
control. Results are displayed in Tables 19 and 20. The estimate on wealth is positive but hardly significant.
However, the estimates on group size are negative, significant and very close to our baseline results.
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yield larger negative effects of increasing group size. Next, as expected, the results indicate
that downside basis risk significantly reduces the demand for index insurance (about 10%
points), upside basis risk increases index take-up (about 62% points), while offering premium
discounts significantly increase the take-up (approximately 0.33%).
These results are inconsistent with theoretical and empirical findings in studies of infor-
mation diffusion which will predict increased uptake of index insurance with an increase in
exposed group size (e.g., Jackson and Yariv 2010; Banerjee et al. 2013).
2.6 Conclusion
Our evaluation of the effect of informal risk sharing schemes on the take-up for index in-
surance, documents that the effects are ambiguous and driven by two forces: sensitivities
to basis risk and insurance premium, which operate through risk aversion. In our model,
we consider the case of an individual who endogenously chooses to join a group and make
decisions about index insurance. The presence of an individual in a risk sharing arrangement
reduces his risk aversion, termed “Effective Risk Aversion”. We appeal to this phenomenon of
“Effective Risk Aversion” to establish that such reduction in risk aversion can lead to either
reduced or increased take up of index insurance, and emphasize how these results provide
alternative explanations for two empirical puzzles: unexpectedly low take-up for index insur-
ance and demand being particularly low for the most risk averse. Our model provide several
testable hypotheses with implications for the design of index insurance contracts. Drawing
on data from a panel of field experimental trials in India, we provide evidence for several
predictions that emerge from our analyses.
Our study is an initial step towards the broader understanding of the linkages between
informal risk-sharing and the market for formal index insurance. In ongoing research, we
test the predictions from the model both in the laboratory and the field. Further, we aim
to draw on the literature on network analysis and multi-dimensional matching to analyze
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the interactions between index insurance and informal arrangements to inform the design of
policy and index contracts. This line of work has broader implications for the design and
introduction of insurance and financial contracts that aim at mitigating environmental risks
among low-income societies.
Figure 2.1: Index Take-up under Large Losses
Notes : Assumptions underlying Figure 1 are as follows: p = q = 13 , L = 1, r =
1
9 ,   =
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(b) REVENUE LOSS: DOWNSIDE VS UPSIDE BASIS RISK
Notes : Figures display the distribution of basis risk measured as the mismatch between
households experience of pre-insurance loss in crops or revenue and receiving an index payout,
respectively. This shown for both downside and upside basis risks. Revenue is measured
for market years in which a crop loss is reported, and captures the “amount” of crop loss:
calculated as the difference between that market year’s agricultural output and the mean
value of output in all previous years where crop loss was not reported.
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Table 2.2: Summary Statistics
Notes : Table reports the summary statistics of the panel data used for our empirical analysis.
This include information about take-up of rainfall-index insurance, premium and randomized
discounts, crop and revenue loss experience of households, multiple treatments for risk-
sharing, proxied by cues on “group identity”, and basis risks respectively. 1(.) is a logical
indicator that takes the value 1 whenever the argument in the bracket is true, and zero
otherwise. The merged data spans 2006-2013, covering 645 households across a pool of 60
villages. These are located in three districts in the state of Gujarat, namely: Ahmedabad,
Anand and Patan.
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Table 2.3: Crop Mismatch t1: Index Demand-Group Identity link vs Basis Risk
Notes : Table reports the results from regressions of take-up for rainfall-index insurance on
a vector of treatments for risk-sharing proxied by cues on “group identity” and their inter-
actions with basis risk and discount assignments–exogenous variation in insurance premium
at the household level. Columns (1)-(4) differ based on the included risk-sharing treatments
and interactions with basis risk, and controls for premium discount and upside basis risk.
Columns (2) - (4) include the various interaction terms, while column (1) omits the inter-
actions. Errors are clustered at the village level. Stars indicate significance: ∗∗∗, ∗∗, and ∗
stand for significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.
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Table 2.4: Crop Mismatch t2: Index Demand-Group Identity link vs Basis Risk
Notes : Table shows the results from regressions of take-up for rainfall-index insurance on
a vector of treatments for risk-sharing proxied by cues on “group identity” and their inter-
actions with basis risk and discount assignments–exogenous variation in insurance premium
at the household level. Columns (1)-(3) differ based on the included risk-sharing treatments
and interactions with basis risk and premium discount. Columns (1) includes the various
interaction terms with basis risk, column (2) adds a control for premium discount, while
column (3) adds controls for both premium discounts and upside basis risk. Errors are clus-
tered at the village level. Stars indicate significance: ∗∗∗, ∗∗, and ∗ stand for significance at
the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.
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Table 2.5: Revenue Mismatch t1: Index Demand-Group Identity link vs Basis Risk
Notes : Table reports the results from regressions of take-up for rainfall-index insurance on
a vector of treatments for risk-sharing proxied by cues on “group identity” and their inter-
actions with basis risk and discount assignments–exogenous variation in insurance premium
at the household level. Columns (1)-(4) differ based on the included risk-sharing treatments
and interactions with basis risk, and controls for premium discount and upside basis risk.
Columns (2) - (4) include the various interaction terms, while column (1) omits the inter-
actions. Errors are clustered at the village level. Stars indicate significance: ∗∗∗, ∗∗, and ∗
stand for significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.
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Table 2.6: Revenue Mismatch t2: Index Demand-Group Identity link vs Basis Risk
Notes : Table shows the results from regressions of take-up for rainfall-index insurance on
a vector of treatments for risk-sharing proxied by cues on “group identity” and their inter-
actions with basis risk and discount assignments–exogenous variation in insurance premium
at the household level. Columns (1)-(3) differ based on the included risk-sharing treatments
and interactions with basis risk and premium discount. Column (1) includes the various
interaction terms with basis risk, column (2) adds a control for premium discount, while
column (3) adds controls for both premium discounts and upside basis risk. Errors are clus-
tered at the village level. Stars indicate significance: ∗∗∗, ∗∗, and ∗ stand for significance at
the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.
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0 .2 .4 .6 .8 1
Normalized risk aversion rA
Observed, individual level
Calculated, group level
Oberved individual rA vs Theory−derived effective rA
Notes : Figure shows the distribution of risk aversion elicited (i.e., observed) in the 2006/2007
baseline household surveys. For each village group level v, we apply our theoretical rule that
says that the effective risk aversion  i=v⇤ is less than the minimum of all members risk
aversion in that village to derived the distribution of effective risk aversion. This is jointly
displayed with observed values of risk aversion.
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Table 2.7: Crop Mismatch t1: Index Demand-Group Identity link vs Price Effects
Notes : Table reports the results from regressions of take-up for rainfall-index insurance on
a vector of treatments for risk-sharing proxied by cues on “group identity” and their inter-
actions with basis risk and discount assignments–exogenous variation in insurance premium
at the household level. Columns (1)-(4) differ based on the included risk-sharing treatments
and interactions with premium discount, and controls for both downside and upside basis
risks. Columns (2) - (4) include the various interaction terms, while column (1) omits the
interactions. Errors are clustered at the village level. Stars indicate significance: ∗∗∗, ∗∗,
and ∗ stand for significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.
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Table 2.8: Crop Mismatch t2: Index Demand-Group Identity link vs Price Effects
Notes : Table shows the results from regressions of take-up for rainfall-index insurance on
a vector of treatments for risk-sharing proxied by cues on “group identity” and their inter-
actions with basis risk and discount assignments–exogenous variation in insurance premium
at the household level. Columns (1)-(3) differ based on the included risk-sharing treatments
and interactions with premium discount and basis risk. Column (1) includes the various
interaction terms with premium discount, column (2) adds a control for [downside] basis
risk, while column (3) adds controls for both downside and upside basis risks. Errors are
clustered at the village level. Stars indicate significance: ∗∗∗, ∗∗, and ∗ stand for significance
at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.
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Table 2.9: Revenue Mismatch t1: Index Demand-Group Identity link vs Price Effects
Notes : Table reports the results from regressions of take-up for rainfall-index insurance on
a vector of treatments for risk-sharing proxied by cues on “group identity” and their inter-
actions with basis risk and discount assignments–exogenous variation in insurance premium
at the household level. Columns (1)-(4) differ based on the included risk-sharing treatments
and interactions with premium discount, and controls for both downside and upside basis
risks. Columns (2) - (4) include the various interaction terms, while column (1) omits the
interactions. Errors are clustered at the village level. Stars indicate significance: ∗∗∗, ∗∗,
and ∗ stand for significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.
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Table 2.10: Revenue Mismatch t2: Index Demand-Group Identity link vs Price Effects
Notes : Table shows the results from regressions of take-up for rainfall-index insurance on
a vector of treatments for risk-sharing proxied by cues on “group identity” and their inter-
actions with basis risk and discount assignments–exogenous variation in insurance premium
at the household level. Columns (1)-(3) differ based on the included risk-sharing treatments
and interactions with premium discount and basis risk. Columns (1) includes the various
interaction terms with premium discount, column (2) adds a control for [downside] basis
risk, while column (3) adds controls for both downside and upside basis risks. Errors are
clustered at the village level. Stars indicate significance: ∗∗∗, ∗∗, and ∗ stand for significance
at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.
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Table 2.11: Examining Two Forces: Basis Risk vs Price Sensitivities
Notes : Table shows the results from regressions of take-up for rainfall-index insurance on
basis risk and discount assignments–exogenous variation in insurance premium and their
interactions with risk aversion at the household level. Columns (1)-(3) differ based on the
included interactions with risk aversion. Columns (1) use market year dummies to control
for sensitivity to changes in premium, and includes an interaction between [downside] basis
risk and risk aversion, while column (2)-(3) directly controls for sensitivity to basis risk, and
include interactions between premium discounts and risk aversion. Errors are clustered at
the village level. Stars indicate significance: ∗∗∗, ∗∗, and ∗ stand for significance at the 1%,
5%, and 10% level, respectively.
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Table 2.12: Group cues: Does Larger Group size lead to Lower Index Demand?
Notes : Table reports the results from regressions of take-up for rainfall-index insurance on
group size (i.e, number of households that received “Group” cues), along with controls for
basis risk and exogenous changes in premium at the household level. Columns (1)-(4) differ
based on the included controls. Column (1) excludes all controls, column (2) adds a control
for sensitivity to [downside] basis risk, column (3) adds controls for both downside and upside
basis risks, while column (4) sequentially adds a control for premium discounts. Errors are
clustered at the village level. Stars indicate significance: ∗∗∗, ∗∗, and ∗ stand for significance
at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.
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(b) WEALTH QUINTILES
Notes : Figures display the distribution of household wealth. Wealth is estimated using Fac-
tor analysis and based on eight (8) household asset holdings: 1(Electricity=Yes), 1(Mobile
Phone=Yes), 1(Sew Machine=Yes), 1(Tractor=Yes), 1(Thresher=Yes), 1(Bull cart=Yes),
1(Bicycle=Yes), and 1(Motorcycle=Yes). 1(.) is a logical indicator that equals 1 whenever
the argument in the bracket is true, and 0 otherwise. Q3 is missing, as there are few to no
households in this bracket.
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Table 2.13: Hindu cues: Does Larger Group size lead to Lower Index Demand?
Notes : Table reports the results from regressions of take-up for rainfall-index insurance on
group size (i.e, number of households that received “Hindu” cues), along with controls for
basis risk and exogenous changes in premium at the household level. Columns (1)-(4) differ
based on the included controls. Column (1) excludes all controls, column (2) adds a control
for sensitivity to [downside] basis risk, column (3) adds controls for both downside and upside
basis risks, while column (4) sequentially adds a control for premium discounts. Errors are
clustered at the village level. Stars indicate significance: ∗∗∗, ∗∗, and ∗ stand for significance
at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.
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Table 2.14: Muslim cues: Does Larger Group size lead to Lower Index Demand?
Notes : Table reports the results from regressions of take-up for rainfall-index insurance on
group size (i.e, number of households that received “Muslim” cues), along with controls for
basis risk and exogenous changes in premium at the household level. Columns (1)-(4) differ
based on the included controls. Column (1) excludes all controls, column (2) adds a control
for sensitivity to [downside] basis risk, column (3) adds controls for both downside and upside
basis risks, while column (4) sequentially adds a control for premium discounts. Errors are
clustered at the village level. Stars indicate significance: ∗∗∗, ∗∗, and ∗ stand for significance
at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.
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Table 2.15: Reported-Crop Loss Experience on Household Characteristics
Notes : Table reports the results from regressions of reported-crop loss experience on a
vector of household characteristics. 1(.) is a logical indicator that equals 1 whenever the
argument in the bracket is true, and 0 otherwise. Columns (1)-(5) differ based on the
included controls. Column (1) includes only demographic characteristics, column (2) adds
a control for educational level, column (3) adds controls for household assets, column (4)
adds an indicator for whether the household has any formal insurance, while column (5)
adds controls for per capita monthly expenditure, risk aversion, and indicators for whether
respondent has a muslim name and irrigates farm. Errors are robust to heteroskedasticity.
Stars indicate significance: ∗∗∗, ∗∗, and ∗ stand for significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10%
level, respectively.
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Table 2.16: Balance on Household Characteristics
Notes : Table reports the results from regressions of risk-sharing treatment groups on a
vector of household characteristics. 1(.) is a logical indicator that equals 1 whenever the
argument in the bracket is true, and 0 otherwise. Columns include the set of all seventeen
(17) demographic characteristics. Errors are robust to heteroskedasticity. Stars indicate
significance: ∗∗∗, ∗∗, and ∗ stand for significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.
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Table 2.17: Wealth Control: Index Demand-Group Identity linkages
Notes : Table shows the results from regressions of take-up for rainfall-index insurance on
basis risk and discount assignments–exogenous variation in insurance premium, and inter-
actions with risk-sharing treatments, while controlling for potential wealth effects. Columns
(1) and (2) differ based on how basis risk is defined: mismatch between payouts and crop
losses in column (1) versus mismatch between payouts and revenue losses in column (2).
Errors are clustered at the village level. Stars indicate significance: ∗∗∗, ∗∗, and ∗ stand for
significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.
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Table 2.18: Wealth Control: Index Demand-Group Identity linkages
Notes : Table shows the results from regressions of take-up for rainfall-index insurance on
basis risk and discount assignments–exogenous variation in insurance premium, and inter-
actions with risk-sharing treatments, while controlling for potential wealth effects. Columns
(1) and (2) differ based on how basis risk is defined: mismatch between payouts and crop
losses in column (1) versus mismatch between payouts and revenue losses in column (2).
Errors are clustered at the village level. Stars indicate significance: ∗∗∗, ∗∗, and ∗ stand for
significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.
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Table 2.19: Wealth Control: Does Larger Group lead to Lower Demand?
Notes : Table reports the results from regressions of take-up for rainfall-index insurance on
group size, along with controls for basis risk, exogenous changes in premium and potential
wealth effects. 1(.) is a logical indicator that equals 1 whenever the argument in the bracket
is true, and 0 otherwise. Columns (1)-(3) differ based on how group size is defined. In column
(1), group size refers to the number of households that received “Group” cues. In column
(2), group size refers to the number of households that received “Hindu” cues. In column
(3), group size refers to the number of households that received “Muslim” cues. Errors are
clustered at the village level. Stars indicate significance: ∗∗∗, ∗∗, and ∗ stand for significance
at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.
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Table 2.20: Nonlinear Wealth Control: Does Larger Group lead to Lower Demand?
Notes : Table reports the results from regressions of take-up for rainfall-index insurance on
group size, along with controls for basis risk, exogenous changes in premium and potential
nonlinear wealth effects (i.e., include wealth quintile dummies: Q1-Q5 with Q1 being omitted
category). The coefficient on Q3 is not estimable, since there are no households in the third
quintile of the distribution. 1(.) is a logical indicator that equals 1 whenever the argument
in the bracket is true, and 0 otherwise. Columns (1)-(3) differ based on how group size is
defined. In column (1), group size refers to the number of households that received “Group”
cues. In column (2), group size refers to the number of households that received “Hindu”
cues. In column (3), group size refers to the number of households that received “Muslim”
cues. Errors are clustered at the village level. Stars indicate significance: ∗∗∗, ∗∗, and ∗
stand for significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.
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Proof of Lemma 1
The proof for Lemma 1 is similar to arguments in Wang (2014).
Let zi and zg denote the income of individual i and representative individual g. Suppose
i and g form a pair. We denote the combined income of the pair, zi⇤ ⌘ zi + zg. If i
wishes to promise utility ⇠ to his partner g, then the corresponding efficient sharing rule
(zi0   s(zi⇤ , ⇠), s(zi⇤ , ⇠)) must satisfy
s⇤(zi⇤ , ⇠) ⌘ argmax
s
Eui(zi⇤   s) s.t. Eug(s)   ⇠ (2.1)
Varying ⇠, the solutions s⇤ describe the set of efficient sharing rules.
Let f(zi⇤) denote the joint density function for combined income. Plugging in the utility






 e  gs(zi⇤ )f(zi⇤)dz    e ⇠
The inequality in the constraint will hold with equality since transferring income to
individual g comes at the cost of reducing i’s income.
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where as individual g’s expected utility can be written as
Eug(⇠) =  e ⇠
For individual i with CARA utility function with income zi, there is a simple relation
between the certainty equivalent (CEi) and the expected utility:
 e  iCEi = E( e  izi)
which gives us
CEi =   1
 i
logE(e  izi)


















Thus we observe that increasing certainty individual of individual g by one unit leads to a
reduction in certainty equivalent of individual i by one unit. Hence certainty equivalents are
transferable across individuals and since expected utility is a monotonic transformation of
certainty equivalent, we get that the expected utility is transferable as well. This concludes
the proof of Lemma 1.
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Proof of Lemma 2
From the proof of Lemma 1, we found that if risk is shared efficiently then we get



















With TU, the sum of the CEs correspond to the joint maximization of the group (i, g)’s
welfare. From the last equality, this is identical to the maximization problem of a represen-
tative individual with risk aversion parameter  i⇤and income process zi⇤ .
Further, since 1 i⇤ =
1
 i




Proof of Lemma 3
Let CE0g , CE0i⇤ denote the certainty equivalent for the group g without individual i and the





i . Notice that:







log([1  p] + pe i⇤L)
and
CE0g = wg  
 g 2g
2
Hence it is sufficient to show that
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Proof: This follows from observing that  i⇤ < min( g,  i) by lemma 2.
CLAIM 2:   1 i⇤ log([1  p] + pe i⇤L) >   1 i log([1  p] + pe iL)
Proof: This follows from observing that the LHS is the CE for a representative agent with
risk aversion  i⇤ for a gamble v while the RHS is the CE for an individual with risk aversion
 i >  i⇤ for the same gamble v. Since CE is decreasing in risk aversion, the claim follows.
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3.1 Introduction
Innovation is an important factor of economic growth and hence, much research has been
devoted to studying its determinants. A recent strand of the literature has focussed on
the attributes of entrepreneurs and CEOs in innovative industries to identify characteristics
associated with innovation and one finding is that overconfidence, defined as “the tendency
of individuals to think that they are better than they really are in terms of characteristics
such as ability, judgment, or prospects for successful life outcomes”, is associated with higher
innovation (e.g., Galasso and Simcoe 2011; Gervais, Heaton, and Odean 2011; Hirshleifer,
Low, and Teoh 2012). A second strand of the literature has focussed on how agency problems
in financing of innovation, arising from the separation of financier and innovator, leads to
inefficiencies (e.g., Bergemann and Hege 2005; Hall and Lerner 2010; Hörner and Samuelson
2012). In this paper, I study how overconfidence and financial frictions impact entrepreneurs
by shaping their incentives to learn. Some natural questions arise in the light of the above
findings such as, does overconfidence of entrepreneurs lead to more efficient experimentation?
What does the interaction of the overconfident entrepreneurs and the agency problems in
financing imply for welfare? How do the answers to the above questions depend on the
nature of financing?
To study these issues, I consider a continuous time model in which an entrepreneur has an
irreversible project. The outcome of the project depends on both the quality of the project
and the ability of the entrepreneur, both of which are unknown. The implementation of the
project can be postponed, enabling learning about the quality of the project as long as the
project has not been launched2. In the benchmark case, the entrepreneur has correct belief
about his own ability and has sufficient funds to implement the project. The entrepreneur,
when deciding on when to implement the project, faces a trade-off between discounting and
learning: waiting delays the realization of payoff, but leads to better information about the
2This is meant to capture the idea that entrepreneurs experiment by running tests to learn about the
quality of the projects before implementing them.
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quality of the project. The efficient experimentation time is a decreasing function of his
belief regarding his ability and a positive function of the cost of implementing the project.
In case the entrepreneur has no funds of his own to implement the project, he has to
rely on investors for funds. I analyze two polar cases which differ in the allocation of bar-
gaining power among the investor and the entrepreneur. In the first case, the investor has
the bargaining power. She funds the project, decides on when to implement the project
and also on the division of the surplus in case of the project succeeding. In the second
case, the entrepreneur decides when to implement the project, and seeks funding from a
competitive market of investors at the time of implementation of project. The moral haz-
ard problem arises from the fact that while the funds are supplied by the investor, the
entrepreneur controls the allocation of the funds. He can either use the funds to imple-
ment the project, or can divert the funds to his private uses. Hence, the contract between
the investor and entrepreneur has to ensure that the entrepreneur uses the fund properly.
Under investor bargaining power, the agency problem leads to delayed implementation and
over-experimentation since the “effective” cost of implementation includes the cost of imple-
menting the project as well as the cost of incentivizing the agent to properly use the funds.
Under entrepreneur bargaining power, the main friction comes from the fact the implemen-
tation has to be delayed till the point where the probability of success is high enough so that
the expected surplus received by the entrepreneur exceeds the benefits of diverting funds to
private uses.
I next consider the case of an overconfident entrepreneur who overestimates his ability.
Such overconfidence leads to under-experimentation and early implementation of the project
compared to efficient experimentation if the project is self-financed by the entrepreneur.
However, if the project is funded by investors, then the presence of an overconfident en-
trepreneur leads to a more efficient experimentation compared to an entrepreneur who
has accurate beliefs about himself. This is because, under investor bargaining power, it
is cheaper to incentivize an entrepreneur who overestimates his probability of success. Un-
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der entrepreneur bargaining power, the increase in efficiency comes from the fact that the
cutoff point for providing financing is lower. This is because, the entrepreneur overesti-
mates his chance of succeeding and hence one can implement the project at an earlier date
where beliefs about the quality of the project is lower. Thus, overconfidence alleviates the
inefficiency caused due to the agency problems.
The paper contributes to the literature on agency problems and financing of innovation.
Bobtcheff and Levy (2017) considers a real option model3 in which a cash-constrained en-
trepreneur learns prior to investing, at a speed which is private information and use the time
of investment to signal his learning ability. The paper demonstrates that, depending on the
learning speed of the entrepreneur types, it is possible to have both hurried and delayed
investment compared to the efficient investment timing. In contrast, I focus on the impact
of moral hazard in an investment timing model in which the speed of learning is known and
demonstrate that moral hazard might lead to either delayed investment or have no impact
on efficient investment timing depending on the allocation of bargaining power.
The paper is also related to Bergemann and Hege (2005) which studies contracting for ex-
perimentation and moral hazard4. Bergemann and Hege consider the financing of a research
project under uncertainty about the time of completion and the probability of eventual suc-
cess and find that agency effect leads to an under-experimentation. In contrast, I find that
agency problem leads to over-experimentation. In both the models, agency problems lead
to an effective increase in the cost of implementing projects. However, learning in my model
serves to save on the cost of implementing bad projects and hence, the higher the cost of
implementing projects leads to more learning.
The paper contributes to the literature on overconfidence and moral hazard5. De la Rosa
(2011) suggests that an overconfidence has conflicting effects on agent’s incentives. On the
3See also Grenadier and Wang (2005), Grenadier, Malenko, and Malenko (2016) for agency problems in
a real option model.
4See also Hörner and Samuelson (2013); Halac, Kartik and Liu (2016); Manso (2011) for moral hazard
and experimentation.
5see Köszegi (2014) for a survey
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one hand, the agent values success-contingent payments, and thus prefers higher-powered
incentives. On the other hand, if the agent overestimates the extent to which his actions
affect outcomes, lower-powered incentives are sufficient to induce any given effort level. In
my model, only the second channel operates and this leads to a decrease in the effective cost
of implementing project which leads to more efficient learning.
Finally, the paper also contributes to the literature on overconfidence and innovation.
Galasso and Simcoe (2010) develop a career concern model to demonstrate that overconfident
CEOs who underestimate the probability of failure are more likely to pursue innovation.
Hirshleifer, Low, and Teoh (2012) suggests that overconfidence leads to CEOs to invest in
more riskier projects. In contrast, I focus on a new channel, learning via investment timing
and indicate that even though overconfident entrepreneurs/CEOs invest more, it may not
be welfare maximizing to do so.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, I describe the model setup and
solve for the benchmark case in which the agent funds the project and has accurate beliefs
regarding his ability. I also describe the moral hazard problem and analyze its implication
under different allocation of bargaining power. In Section 3, I consider the case of overcon-
fident agents and analyze the outcome under self funding as well as funding from investors
under different allocation of bargaining power and I conclude in Section 4.
3.2 Model
A risk neutral entrepreneur has a project with unknown return. With probability p0, the
project is of good quality, and with probability 1   p0, the project is of bad quality. The
success of the project depends on both its quality as well as the ability of the entrepreneur.
The ability of the entrepreneur is persistent and is either high or low. The entrepreneur’s true
ability is unknown and the probability that he is high ability is ↵ 2 (0, 1). A bad project, if
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implemented, fails regardless of the ability of the entrepreneur, while a good project succeeds
with probability 16 if the entrepreneur is of high ability. It costs c > 0 to implement the
project and success in the project creates a surplus of R. If the project results in failure or
if the project is not implemented, a surplus of 0 is generated.
Time t is continuous with an infinite horizon and the future is discounted at rate r > 0.
The decision of whether to implement the project need not be taken at t = 0, but can
be delayed. The advantage of delaying implementation is that it enables information to
be collected about the quality of the project. Following Décamps and Mariotti (2004) and
Bobtcheff and Levy (2017), information about the project is modeled as a Poisson process.
If the project is bad, then the probability news arrives by time t is 1  e t, where   > 0. If
the project is good, no news arrives. Hence, information here is modeled as a “bad news”:
the arrival of news immediately indicates the project is bad. Let st denote the probability
that no news arrives till time t:
st = p0 + (1  p0)e  t.
Following Bayes’ rule, the belief at date t that the project is good given no bad news till






p0 + (1  p0)e  t .
Note that pt is an increasing function of t. The Poisson process is observed for free and news
is also public.
I analyze the project implementation problem under three different scenarios. In the first
scenario, the entrepreneur has enough funds to implement project. In the second scenario,
the entrepreneur has no money of his own, a risk neutral investor with a discount rate r
funds the project, decides on when to implement the project and also on the division of the
surplus. I refer to this as the scenario in which the investor the bargaining power. In the
third scenario, the entrepreneur decides when to implement the project, but does not have
6This is without loss of generality, the results hold if one assumes that the good project succeeds with
probability   > 0 if the entrepreneur is of high ability.
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funds of his own to implement the project. Hence, the entrepreneur seeks funding from a
competitive market of investors at the time of implementation of project. The competitive
market of investors is represented by a single investor who can only accept or reject the
division of surplus proposed by the entrepreneur. I refer to this as the scenario in which the
entrepreneur has the bargaining power.
In the scenarios, where the funds are supplied by the investor, the entrepreneur controls
the allocation of the funds. He can either use the funds to implement the project, or can
divert the funds to his private use. This is the source of the agency problem in the model7.
Assumption on Parameters: I make two assumptions regarding parameters of the
model:
Assumption 1: p0↵R < c.
Assumption 2: ↵R > 2c.
The first assumption implies that the project is not implemented at t = 0, while the
second assumption implies that the project is implemented if it known that the project
quality is good. These two assumptions guarantee a strictly positive solution for the time of
implementation of project.
3.2.1 Entrepreneur Uses Own Funds
I first analyze the case in which the entrepreneur funds the project. The entrepreneur
chooses to wait till time t before implementing the project at a cost of c. If the entrepreneur
receives news before time t, he chooses to not implement the project. Thus the entrepreneur’s
problem is to choose the time of implementation t, to maximize8
7Following Biais, Mariotti, Plantin and Rochet (2007), the agency problem is thus one in which the
entrepreneur can divert cash that is being advanced to finance the project. However, one can also equivalently
describe the model as the simplest case of the canonical hidden- action model as in Holmström (1979), in
which the entrepreneur needs to exert costly hidden effort in order to have a chance of success.
8Note that the stopping problem can be solved by maximizing the date 0 expected payoff, as the en-




= e rt(p0↵R  c+ (1  st)c)
= e rt(p0(↵R  c)  (1  p0)e  tc)
The expression reflects the trade-off the entrepreneur faces between discounting and learn-
ing: waiting delays the realization of payoff, but it also allows the option to not implement.
Thus waiting allows to avoid the cost c in case bad news arrives.





Observe that the optimal stopping belief is a decreasing function of r,↵, R and   and an
increasing function of c.
3.2.2 Investor Has the Bargaining Power
In this case, the investor decides to wait till time t before implementing the project at a
cost of c . She also decides on the division of surplus to offer to the entrepreneur. Suppose,
that the investor offers a share9 1   yt of the surplus to the entrepreneur if the project is
implemented at time t and succeeds. The investor receives the remaining share yt.
The investor wants to make sure that the entrepreneur allocates the fund properly. If
the entrepreneur diverts the funds, he gets c. If the entrepreneur uses the fund to implement
the project at time t, his expected payoff is given by (1   yt)pt↵R. Hence the incentive
compatibility condition, which states that for the entrepreneur the expected return from
9Given that the only possible outcomes are success or failure if the project is implemented, there is no
loss of generality in restricting the investor to offering the entrepreneur a share of the surplus generated
by a success. In particular, allowing payments conditional on failure would not change the results, as such
payments dampen incentives.
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allocating the funds to implement the project must exceed the value of diverting the funds,
is given by
(1  yt)pt↵R   c
In equilibrium, the above incentive compatibility condition has to hold with equality, for
otherwise the investor can reduce the share of the surplus offered to the entrepreneur and
increase her profit. Thus, one obtains
(1  yt) = c
pt↵R





Comparing the expression for ⇧It to ⇧t in section 2.1 one observes that the “effective” cost
of implementing the project is higher, 2c, compared to c in the case in which the entrepreneur
funds the project. This is because, the cost includes both the actual cost of implementing
the project, as well as the cost of incentivizing the entrepreneur to allocate funds properly.





Proposition 1: Under investor bargaining power and accurate beliefs about ability, the
optimal stopping belief is higher and there is delayed implementation compared to the first
best. There is thus over-experimentation compared to the efficient investment policy.
10Clearly, the investor will choose not to implement the project if news arrives before t.
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3.2.3 Entrepreneur Has the Bargaining Power
In this case, the entrepreneur decides to wait till time t before implementing the project.
He seeks funding from the investor at time t and also decides on the division of surplus to
offer to the investor. Suppose, that the entrepreneur offers a share11 xt of the surplus to the
investor if the project is implemented at time t and succeeds. The entrepreneur receives the
remaining share 1  xt.
The incentive compatibility condition requires that at the time of implementation, for
the entrepreneur the expected return from allocating the funds to implement the project
exceeds the value of diverting the funds. If the entrepreneur diverts the funds, he gets c.
If the entrepreneur uses the fund to implement the project at time t, his expected payoff is
(1  xt)pt↵R. Hence the incentive compatibility condition is given by
(1  xt)pt↵R   c.
Also if the entrepreneur offers a share xt to the investor, the investor will accept it only
if her participation constraint is satisfied, or
xtpt↵R   c.





The entrepreneur offers a share to the investor that solves the participation constraint





11Given that the surplus generated is either R or 0, the security that is issued (debt or equity) is irrelevant.
It is without loss of generality to assume that the entrepreneur raises cash by issuing equity, that is selling
a fraction of the project in exchange for funds.
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One thus observes that if (r+ )cr↵R+ c   2c↵R , then the first best as obtained in Section 2.1 is
implemented. However, if the parameters are such that (r+ )cr↵R+ c <
2c
↵R , then there is late
implementation compared to the first best. This is summarized in the following proposition.
Proposition 2: Under entrepreneur bargaining power and accurate beliefs about ability,
the optimal stopping belief is either higher or same as the first best and there is either delayed
implementation compared to the first best or efficient implementation. There is thus either
over-experimentation compared to the efficient investment policy or the efficient investment
policy is implemented.
3.3 Overconfidence
In this section, I consider the case where the entrepreneur overestimates the probability of
him being of high ability. The entrepreneur believes that the probability he is of high ability
is given by ↵E 2 (0, 1), where ↵E > ↵. The investor’s belief about the probability of the
entrepreneur being of high ability is given by ↵, and the investor’s belief as well as the
entrepreneur’s belief is common knowledge. Such disagreement about beliefs is plausible for
12Since news is observable to the investor as well as the entrepeneur, the investor will fund the project
only if there is no news before t.
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instance, in situations in which the investor judges the entrepreneur’s ability according to the
population mean, knowing that entrepreneurs tend to be overconfident. If the entrepreneur’s
beliefs are independent of true ability, then the investor disregards such beliefs as uninforma-
tive. Similarly, since the investor’s beliefs are made on the basis of the population mean and
does not take into account the individual entrepreneur, the entrepreneur can also disregard
the investor’s belief about his ability13. There is also empirical backing for individuals over-
estimating probability of favorable events, especially in situations in which they have some
control over the outcome of events (e.g., Taylor and Brown 1988; Camerer and Lovallo 1999).
Such overconfidence is especially common among entrepreneurs and CEOs (e.g., Larwood
and Whittaker 1977; Cooper, Woo, and Dunkelberg 1988; Shane 2003).
Assumption on Parameters: I make the following additional assumption regarding
parameters of the model:
Assumption 3: p0↵ER < c
This assumption implies that the overconfident entrepreneur will not implement the
project at t = 0, and along with Assumption 2, guarantees a strictly positive solution for
the time of implementation of project.
3.3.1 Entrepreneur Uses Own Funds
The entrepreneur chooses the time of implementation t, to maximize
⇧Ot = e
 rtst(pt↵ER  c)
= e rt(p0↵ER  c+ (1  st)c)
= e rt(p0(↵ER  c)  (1  p0)e  tc)
13For other examples of sources of heterogeneity in priors, see Morris (1995), Benabou and Tirole (2002),
Van den Steen (2004), and other examples cited in De la Rosa (2011).
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Proposition 3: If the entrepreneur is overconfident about his ability and uses his own
funds to implement the project, the optimal stopping belief is lower and there is hurried
implementation compared to the first best. There is thus under-experimentation compared
to the efficient investment policy.
3.3.2 Investor Has the Bargaining Power
In this case, the investor decides to wait till time t before implementing the project at a
cost of c . She also decides on the division of surplus to offer to the entrepreneur. Suppose,
that the investor offers a share 1   yOt of the surplus to the entrepreneur if the project is
implemented at time t and succeeds. The investor receives the remaining share yOt .
The incentive compatibility condition in this case requires that at the time of implemen-
tation, the expected return to the entrepreneur from allocating the funds to implement the
project exceeds the value of diverting the funds. If the entrepreneur diverts the funds, he
gets c. If the entrepreneur uses the fund to implement the project at time t, his expected
payoff is (1  yOt )pt↵ER. Hence the incentive compatibility condition is given by
(1  yOt )pt↵ER   c.
In equilibrium, the incentive compatibility condition will hold with equality, hence one
obtains




Comparing 1  yt and 1  yOt , one observes that a lower share of the surplus is sufficient
to incentive an overconfident entrepreneur, since the overconfident believes that he has a
higher probability of succeeding compared to an entrepreneur with accurate beliefs. This
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result is similar to that in De la Rosa (2011), who finds that if the agent overestimates the
extent to which his actions affect outcomes, lower-powered incentives are sufficient to induce
any given effort level.




= e rtst(pt↵R  c  ↵
↵E
c)
The optimal stopping belief pIOt is given by
pIOt =
(r +  )(1 + ↵↵E )c











Proposition 4: If the entrepreneur is overconfident about his ability, then under investor
bargaining power, the optimal stopping belief is higher and the time of implementation is
delayed compared to the first best. Compared to the case with accurate beliefs, the optimal
stopping belief and the time of implementation under overconfidence is closer to the first
best optimal stopping belief and the first best time of implementation. Thus overconfidence
assists in reducing the inefficiency due to the agency problem.
3.3.3 Entrepreneur Has the Bargaining Power
In this case, the entrepreneur decides to wait till time t before implementing the project.
He seeks funding from the investor at time t and also decides on the division of surplus to
offer to the investor. Suppose, that the entrepreneur offers a share xOt of the surplus to the
investor if the project is implemented at time t and succeeds. The entrepreneur receives the
remaining share 1  xOt .
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The incentive compatibility condition requires that at the time of implementation, for
the entrepreneur the expected return from allocating the funds to implement the project
exceeds the value of diverting the funds. If the entrepreneur diverts the funds, he gets c.
If the entrepreneur uses the fund to implement the project at time t, his expected payoff is
(1  xOt )pt↵ER. Hence incentive compatibility condition is given by
(1  xOt )pt↵ER   c.
Also if the entrepreneur offers a share xOt to the investor, the investor will accept it only
if her participation constraint is satisfied, or
xOt pt↵R   c.
The entrepreneur offers a share to the investor that solves the participation constraint













Compared to the case with accurate beliefs on behalf of the entrepreneur, one observes
that the cutoff belief for providing financing is lower. This is because, the entrepreneur
overestimates his chance of succeeding and hence the entrepreneur’s incentive compatibility
condition is satisfied for a lower value of pt compared to the case with accurate beliefs. Note
that, in contrast to the scenario under investor bargaining, the share of the surplus going to
the entrepreneur remains unchanged regardless of the belief of the entrepreneur, that is,
1  xOt = 1  xt.
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One can compare pEOt to the expression for pEt obtained in Section 2.3, to study the impact

















The above inequalities imply that if under entrepreneur bargaining power and accurate
belief of the entrepreneur, the investment policy was efficient, then it is also efficient if the
entrepreneur is overoptimistic. Finally, if (r+ )cr↵R+ c <
2c































Hence, overconfidence leads to an improvement in terms of getting closer to efficient in-
vestment policy and can also implement the efficient investment policy.
Proposition 5: If the entrepreneur is overconfident about his ability, then under en-
trepreneur bargaining power, the optimal stopping belief is either higher or the same as the
first best and there is either delayed implementation compared to the first best or efficient
implementation. Compared to the case with accurate beliefs, the optimal stopping belief and
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the time of implementation under overconfidence is closer to the first best optimal stopping
belief and the first best time of implementation. Thus overconfidence assists in reducing
the inefficiency due to the agency problem and can also lead to the implementation of the
efficient investment policy.
The analysis in Sections 2 and 3 also allows one to compare the investment decisions of
the entrepreneur with accurate belief and the overconfident entrepreneur.
Proposition 6: An overconfident entrepreneur implements (1) strictly more projects
compared to an entrepreneur with accurate belief if the project is self financed by the en-
trepreneur or if the project is financed by an investor who has bargaining power and (2)
weakly more projects compared to an entrepreneur with accurate belief if the project is
financed by an investor and the entrepreneur has the bargaining power. Overconfidence cre-
ates inefficiency in case of self financing by the entrepreneur but weakly improves efficiency
if the project is financed by an investor.
3.4 Conclusion
This paper studied a model in which an entrepreneur learns about the quality of project
before deciding whether to implement the project. The outcome of project depends on
the quality as well as the unknown ability of the entrepreneur. The possibility of the en-
trepreneur diverting funds, received from investors and meant for project implementation,
to his private uses leads to delayed investment and over-experimentation. An entrepreneur
who is overconfident regarding his ability under-experiments and over invests compared to an
entrepreneur who has accurate beliefs regarding his ability. Such overconfidence on behalf of
the entrepreneur creates inefficiencies when projects are self financed but reduces inefficien-
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cies due to moral hazard in case of funding by investors. There are some questions related to
the issues analyzed in the paper that may be of interest for future research. One possibility
is to relax the common knowledge assumption and consider situations in which there is a
mixture of entrepreneurs with heterogeneous beliefs and abilities and find out under what
circumstances might entrepreneurs overconfident, even if they have accurate beliefs about
their abilities. Another interesting question to study is what happens if there are multiple
projects, and entrepreneurs and investors learn about the entrepreneur’s ability over time
through performance in projects.
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3.6.1 Proof for Section 3.2.1
The entrepreneur chooses t   0 to maximize
⇧t = e
 rtst(pt↵R  c).
Taking derivative of the above expression with respect to t and setting it equal to 0, one
obtains
 r(p0↵R  stc) + c (1  p0)e  t = 0,










p0 + (1  p0)e  t ,





Given Assumptions 1 and 2, one can show that pFBt 2 (p0, 1).
Let tFB be such that
pFBt =
p0
p0 + (1  p0)e  tFB .










One further obtains ⇧t(0) = p0↵R  c < 0, ⇧t(tFB) =  (↵R c) +r > 0 and ⇧t(1) = 0, which
implies that ⇧t is maximized at t = tFB, as claimed.
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3.6.2 Proof for Section 3.2.3
Step One: d⇧tdt (t) is continuous and differentiable for t > 0.
Proof : The proof follows from observing
d⇧t
dt
=  re rt(p0↵R  (p0 + (1  p0)e  t)c) + e (r+ )tc (1  p0).
Step Two: There exists a unique tFB > 0 such that d⇧tdt (t
FB) = 0. Further, d2⇧tdt2 (t
FB) < 0
Proof : Already proved in Section 3.6.1.






















By assumption, the right-hand side can either be positive or zero but never negative, a
contradiction.
Step Four: For each t > tFB, d⇧tdt (t) < 0.
Proof: From Step Two, one obtains that d⇧tdt (t) = 0 has a unique solution, namely t = t
FB.
Hence, there cannot be a z > tFBsuch that d⇧tdt (z) = 0. Assume, for contradiction, that that
there exists a z > tFBsuch that d⇧tdt (z) > 0. From step Three, we know that there exists,
n > tFB such that d⇧tdt (n) < 0. If z > n, then there exists a z > y > n > t
FBsuch that
d⇧t
dt (y) = 0 (since
d⇧t
dt is a continuous function, from Step One), which contradicts t
FBbeing
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a unique solution of d⇧tdt (t) = 0. If z < n, then there exists a n > x > z > t
FBsuch that
d⇧t
dt (x) = 0 (since
d⇧t
dt is a continuous function, from Step One), which contradicts t
FBbeing
a unique solution of d⇧tdt (t) = 0. Hence, for each t > t
FB, d⇧tdt (t) < 0.
Step Five: pEt = max( 2c↵R ,
(r+ )c
r↵R+ c).
Proof: Observe that, ⇧Et = e rtst(pt↵R  c) = ⇧t.
Define t(p), such that p = p0
p0+(1 p0)e  t(p) . Clearly, t(p) is an increasing function of p and
t(pFB) = tFBand let t( 2c↵R) = t
L.





This implies, that the project can only be implemented after t   tL.
Suppose, 2c↵R  (r+ )cr↵R+ c = pFB. This implies that t(pFB)   tL. Hence, tFB is a feasible
choice, and thus for all t   tL,we obtain ⇧Et (tFB) = ⇧t(tFB)   ⇧t(t) = ⇧Et (t). Thus, the
project is implemented at t = tFBand the optimal stopping belief is given by pEt = pFB =
(r+ )c
r↵R+ c .
Suppose, pFB = (r+ )cr↵R+ c <
2c
↵R . Thus, we get t
FB < tL. Since, for each t > tFB, d⇧tdt (t) < 0
(from Step Four), we obtain that for each t   tL > tFB, ⇧Et (t) = ⇧t(t) < ⇧t(tL) = ⇧Et (tL).
Hence, the project is implemented at t = tL and the optimal stopping belief is given by
pEt =
2c
↵R .
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